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SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW AND JURISDICTION
A.

Summary of Proceedings,

The appellants (Little

America Hotel and Hotel Utah), together with a coalition of
other innkeepers filed a lawsuit in the Third District Court
challenging a City revenue license tax.
Judge Timothy R. Hanson of the Third District Court
granted partial summary judgment on the per se validity of
the ordinance and the enabling power issues; however, the
lower court reserved the "as applied" validity questions for
further factual development.

Following admissions of the

appellant-Hotels that they had no facts to demonstrate the
ordinance was discriminatorily applied, the lower court
granted Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Two of the innkeepers, Little America Hotel Corporation
and the Hotel Utah Company, have appealed that decision.
B.

Jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction in the Utah Supreme Court is asserted as
an appeal from a final civil judgment, pursuant to the
provisions of Article VIII, Section 3 of the Utah
Constitution and Section 78-2-2(3) Utah Code Ann., 1953, as
amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented by this appeal:
1.

Are municipal taxing ordinances and their

classifications of taxpayers entitled to a presumption of
constitutionality?

2.

Does Salt Lake City have enabling power to impose a

gross receipts based business revenue tax?
3.

Does the record legally justify the separate tax

classification of the approximately 100 innkeepers within
the City?
4.

Did the lower court err in granting a discovery

protective order (insulating Utah Power and Light Company
from a burdensome production of franchise tax payments made
by innkeeper-competitors of the appellant-Hotels) where
appellants avowed use was to compute the total of all taxes
paid by the class of innkeepers and compare that number with
appellantsf estimated value of governmental services
received?
5.

Does a corporate taxpayer have a legal right to

challenge a taxing classification on the basis of comparing
the amount of total taxes paid with the cost of benefits
received, absent claims of confiscatory taxation or that the
tax rate was wholly arbitrary or capricious as being beyond
the revenue needs of the City?
6.

Is the City's business revenue license tax an

illegal "sales" or "income" tax where:

(a)

the tax is

imposed on the business for the privilege of doing business
in the City and not assessed to the consumer based on the
value of services received; and (b) there is no formula to
deduct expenses or otherwise tax "net" income on a graduated
basis?

7.

Does discretionary enabling power granted to Salt

Lake County to the tax hotels for tourist promotion under
Chapter 31, Title 17 U.C.A. preempt the statutory enabling
power of Salt Lake City to reasonably classify and tax
businesses in the City, under Sections 10-8-39 and 80

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL/STATUTORY
ORDINANCE PROVISIONS
1.

10-8-39 Utah Code Ann,, 1953.

2.

10-8-80 Utah Code Ann., 1953:
10-8-80.

See Appendix "10".

License fees and taxes.

They may raise revenue by levying and
collecting a license fee or tax on any
business within the limits of the city,
and regulate the same by ordinance;
provided, that no Utah city or town
shall collect a license fee or tax
hereunder from any solicitor or salesman
who solicits, obtains orders for or
sells goods in such city or town solely
for resale; and no enumeration of powers
of cities contained in this chapter,
shall be deemed to limit or restrict the
general grant of authority hereby
conferred. All such license fees and
taxes shall be uniform in respect to the
class upon which they are imposed.
3.

Chapter 3, Title 20 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake

City, 1965 as amended.

See Appendix "8".

STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS
A.

Nature of the Case.

Salt Lake City adopted Bill No. 40 of 1982 imposing a
one percent business occupation or privilege tax on the

classification of innkeepers who provide rooms to persons
for 30 days or less.

Three groups of innkeepers challenged

the tax on numerous constitutional, statutory and common-law
grounds.

The appellant-Hotels seek a declaratory judgment

voiding the ordinance and approximately $571,000 in taxes
paid to the date of the Summary Judgment.

If the ordinance

is invalidated, it would prospectively have a revenue impact
on the City of approximately $550,000 per annum.
Following extensive discovery (the record totals over
1300 pages), cross motions for summary judgment were filed
by the appellants and the other innkeepers, who chose not to
appeal.

The lower court reviewed in depth this record and,

after nine months of deliberation, granted a partial summary
judgment to Salt Lake, upholding the per se validity and
constitutionality of the ordinance; it reserved for factual
determination whether or not the tax was being applied in a
discriminatory or unconstitutional manner.
Later, appellants admitted they had no facts on the
remaining issue of the case, and following additional
briefing, Judge Timothy R. Hanson granted Salt Lake City a
complete Summary Judgment of dismissal, with prejudice.
B.

Facts.

The undisputed facts, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the losing party below, but considering the
relevant presumptions and burdens of proof, demonstrate the
following:

1.

Salt Lake City is a municipal corporation of the

State of Utah.

It is the seat of Utah government and the

State's only first class city.

(Article XIX, Section 3 Utah

Constitution; 10-2-301 Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended).
2.

Effective July 1, 1982, Salt Lake City adopted a

Business Occupation Revenue Tax.

This privilege or

occupation tax is imposed on innkeepers, located within the
corporate limits of the City; it totals a maximum of 1% of
gross receipts from the rental of rooms to guests staying 30
days or less, with a minimum base charge.

(Affidavit of

Ruth Dyer; Bill 40 of 1982, R-211).
3.

Should the tax assessments not be paid by the

licensee, the privilege for doing business will be revoked.
It is illegal to operate a business within Salt Lake City,
without a Business Revenue License.

(20-3-3 Revised

Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1965, as amended; Affidavit of
Ruth Dyer, R-211).
4.

Salt Lake City is regional, national and, in some

instances, an international recreation, religions,
governmental, commercial, education and medical center.
These functions draw large numbers of visitors annually to
the City and create a market for services provided by
innkeepers doing business within the City.

(Affidavit of

Craig Peterson, R-202).
5.

Salt Lake has expended substantial public resources

(including lending its credit for industrial revenue bonds)

to maintain a business climate favorable to the appellanthotel and innkeeper businesses.

Among others, these efforts

have included financing development of the Crossroads
Shopping Mall, including the Marriott Hotel; expansion of
the Salt Palace; expanding hospital capacity; and financing
expansion of industrial parks, including the one served by
the Hilton Hotel operated by the lower court plaintiff,
Pearson Enterprises.

(Affidavits of Lance Bateman and Craig

Peterson, R-195, 202, 233).
6.

The City maintains and operates the Salt Lake City

International

Airport and has issued general obligation

bonds to support its development.

As of the filing date of

this suit, it had recently completed a five year,
$80,000,000, expansion project which uniquely benefits the
suppliers of transient rooms by encouraging and permitting
travel of visitors to and from the City.

(Affidavit of

Louis Miller, R-189).
7.

The City has a declining resident population, which

has decreased approximately 13,000 persons within the last
ten years prior to the ordinance adoption.

However, the

cost of government has substantially increased.

This

increase is due to many factors including inflation, but is
also due to expanded commercial and visitor service demands.
It was the specific intent and purpose of the City Council
in passing the innkeeper tax, to ease the increasing tax
burden on the resident population and more equitably share

the cost of providing municipal services to include the
innkeepers whose patrons increase the cost of City
government.
8.

(Affidavit of Sydney Fonnesbeck, R-207).

There are high expenses in providing municipal

services to the central business district, specifically
including hotels and motels catering to transient guests and
visitors.

(Affidavit of Chiefs Willoughby and Pederson, R-

195, 199).
9.

The suppliers of accommodations for transient

guests are a distinct and separate class.

This distinction

is recognized by themselves in forming a trade association
separate from the renters of residential property for
permanent residency.

Further, the taxed class of

innkeepers' accommodations include a full range of services,
such as:

maid, eating, and room service; valet service; and

other conveniences to accommodate persons who are away from
the amenities of their permanent abode.
The rental rate structure is substantially higher for
these innkeepers from those businesses providing permanent
housing.

Further, they engage in marketing activities to

recruit business and recreation travelers seeking
entertainment, business or convention services in the City.
In addition, their guests are away from their permanent
connections to medical, recreation and other contacts.
Thus, the numbers of patrons, rates of turnover, and demand
for City services distinguish the taxed class of innkeepers

from other businesses.

(Affidavit of Robert F. Babcock, R-

229).
10.

For the City's 1982-83 fiscal year $67,502,000

general fund budget, the 1% tax was estimated to generate
approximately $550,000 from the approximately 100 innkeepers
in the City.

This sum constitutes approximately eight-

tenths of one percent (0.8%)) of the City's general fund
budget.

(Affidavit of Lance Bateman, R-233).

11.

Salt Lake City is the seat of State government; a

local center for federal governmental agencies; the
headquarters for the LDS Church, plus many other religious
organizations; the seat of County government; and the
headquarters for many education, eleemosynary, health
service and other tax exempt organizations.

As a result,

approximately 25% of its property for the fiscal year 198283 was property tax exempt.

This fact resulted in a loss of

property tax revenue totaling approximately $4,737,000 per
year.

The innkeepers, including appellants, are direct

beneficiaries of the business and services needed by such
organizations in providing care and hotel accommodations to
their guests and invitees.

(Affidavits of Milton Yorgason

and Lance Bateman, R-192, 233).
12.

None of the innkeeper plaintiffs, including the

appellant hotels, have even alleged that they would be
driven out of business by the imposition of the tax.
entire record).

(See

13.

Although appellant-Little America asserts it

provides enhanced security, garbage and maintenance services
for itself (appellants1 facts Nos. 5, 6 and 7 ) , it is not a
separate enclave. All City services available to any
business in the City are provided to every one of the taxed
class of innkeepers.

There are no facts in the record and

no allegation in the pleadings asserting that any innkeeper
in Salt Lake does not receive full City services, including
police protection; fire protection; paramedic service;
adjacent street maintenance and snow removal.
14.

After over 9 months of deliberation, the lower

court granted a Partial Summary Judgment in favor of
respondent, Salt Lake City, reserving one issue for trial.
That issue is whether the classification for taxation was
"arbitrary and/or discriminatory".

(The lower court f s

Memorandum Decision and Partial Summary dated January 16,
1984, R-913, 924 are attached as Appendix "1" and " 2 ) " .
15.

Disagreements over the meaning of the partial

summary judgment caused the lower court to request
additional briefing and argument; thereafter, the court
clarified its intent and quashed two subpoena duces tecums
directed against Utah Power and Light Company because they
merely sought to impose unreasonable burdens on non-parties
and sought irrelevant information on a rejected theory that
tax payments create a right to an equivalent value of
gQvernmental services.

(See, Memorandum Decision dated May

28, 1984, R-1135 attached as Appendix " 3 " ) .

The lower court

order stated:
The scope and intent of the previous Partial
Summary Judgment was to dismiss all claims,
assertions, and legal theories advanced by
Plaintiff [LAHCO], as a matter of law,
excepting only the issue of whether the tax
classification selected by Salt Lake City
Corporation was arbitrary; that is, the
legislative decision for classification
lacked a rational basis and/or whether the
tax was discriminatory as applied within the
defined tax classification of the ordinance.
The matter left for trial or further
proceeding on the within case does not
include a comparison of the public service
benefits received by the Plaintiff [LAHCO]
from the City in relation to taxes paid by
it. (Emphasis added), (Order Clarifying
Partial Summary Judgment and Granting
Protective Order, R-1141, 1142 attached as
Appendix " 4 " ) .
16.

The appellant hotels admitted that they had no

information on the remaining issue, as defined by the lower
court and Motions for Summary Judgment were filed with
additional briefing on 10 consolidated cases.

(R-1208,

1216, 1233 and Stipulation and Order of Consolidation, R1292).

The lower court heard the arguments, took the matter

under advisement and issued its Minute Entry decision.
1291) attached as Appendix " 6 " ) .

(R-

It granted the final

Summary Judgment in favor of respondent Salt Lake City and
Mayor Ted L. Wilson on July 7, 1987.
Appendix " 7 " ) .

(R-1296, attached as

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1e

Municipal ordinance tax classifications are

presumptively valid.
Like state statutes, municipal taxing ordinances are
presumptively valid and constitutional.

In deference to the

elected legislative body f s responsibilities to the
electorate to create a fair and balanced tax system and in
respect for the separation-of-powers principle, Courts will
indulge in every reasonable construction to render a tax
classification valid; that is, if there exists any rational
basis for a distinction, the class will be approved.
The challenger has the burden to establish, by
admissible evidence, that there is no rational basis for the
classification and must negate every conceivable basis that
might support it, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
These concepts are not in conflict with those asserted
by the appellant-hotels; that is: enabling power or
authority to tax is never inferred and ambiguities in tax
laws will be construed in favor of the taxpayer.

However,

these legal principles are not applicable to the
constitutional challenges advanced by appellants; therefore,
the authority cited is irrelevant.
2.

The City has enabling power to impose a business

revenue license tax on reasonably classed businesses.
Sections 10-8-39 and 80 of the Utah Code specifically
authorizes cities to classify business and tax them solely
to raise general fund revenue.

Appellant-hotels' case law challenging this authority
either does not stand for the proposition asserted or is
distinguishable.
3.

There exist rational distinctions to justify

separate classification of innkeepers as a taxing class.
Uncontroverted facts demonstrate many reasons for
distinguishing transient room providers (innkeepers) as a
separate tax classification.

These distinctions include:

(a) the desire to equitably spread tax burdens to include
others than property taxpayers living in the City; (b) the
benefits uniquely provided to these businesses by the City;
(c) additional service costs generated by the transient
visitor patrons of the tax innkeepers; and (d) the unique
clientele and methods of doing business of innkeepers.
In a frequently litigated area, virtually every
jurisdiction considering the identical or similar challenges
to taxing innkeepers have approved identical
classifications.

In fact, this same class was approved by

this Court in 1966.
The tax classification is rationally based and the
lower court properly so ruled.
4.

A general fund revenue license tax is not limited

in amount to the cost of providing governmental service.
There is a long recognized distinction between a
regulatory or service fee charges and a general fund revenue
tax.

Regulatory and service charges are limited to the cost

of regulation or service; however, general fund revenue
taxes are not so limited.

Appellants have incorrectly cited

"regulatory" cases as authority for an argument against a
"revenue" taxing ordinance.
Courts give great deference to tax rate decisions of
legislative bodies, which are answerable to the electorate.
Only when tax rates are wholly arbitrary will they be
judicially set aside.

To be judicially overturned, they

must be so confiscatory as to destroy, not just a single
taxpayer, but a whole class or be demonstrably beyond the
needs of the taxing jurisdiction.
Also, revenue taxes are not an "assessment of
benefits."

It is irrelevant to an evaluation of a taxing

ordinance that the amount payed by a taxed class is less
than the services provided by the taxing jurisdiction.
Therefore, the lower court properly quashed otherwise
oppressive discovery directed against Utah Power and Light
Company seeking tax information.
Similarly, the opinions about the cost of services
received against taxes paid advanced by appellants' in the
Affidavit from Mr. Norman are irrelevant because they also
go to an "assessment of benefits theory," which does not
state a cause of action, as a matter of law.
Since there exists no facts to demonstrate confiscatory
or wholly arbitrary taxation, beyond the needs of the City,
the tax must be affirmed.

5.

The City revenue tax on innkeepers is imposed as a

privilege or occupation tax and is not an illegal "sales" or
"income" tax.
A "sales" tax is characterized by several incidents,
including the predominating feature that the tax is imposed
on the "transaction" and levied against the consumer.

An

"income" tax is distinguished as a tax against an income
producing entity or person, where the tax is based on "net"
income.

It is often assessed on progressive rates, for tax

and social policy reasons.
By contrast, occupation or privilege taxes are revenue
producing taxes imposed by local jurisdictions for the
privilege of doing business in that community.

The fact

that a revenue license tax is computed as a percentage of
the gross receipts of a business does not render it a
"sales" or "income" tax.

Rather, that method of computation

is simply a fair method selected by the local legislature to
measure benefits to the business and to set equitable rates.
It will not be disturbed by the Courts, unless wholly
arbitrary or confiscatory.
Virtually every other jurisdiction considering the
challenge made by appellants to such license taxes have been
rejected.

This Court should similarly uphold the decision

by the lower court.
6.

The City taxing ordinance has not been preempted by

discretionary state enabling power given to counties to tax
the same class of innkeepers for tourist promotion.

Preemption exists where the state has expressly
prohibited local governmental intrusion into an area or (by
implied preemption) when it has so comprehensively regulated
an area that its intent to exclude local governmental action
is inferred by the Courts.

Chapter 31 of Title 17 of the

Utah Code does neither.
The legislation, in fact, does not even deal with the
state or produce revenue for it; rather, it is simply
discretionary enabling power for a county to tax hotels and
motels to raise money for tourist promotion.

It has no more

dignity or precursive effect than the grant of power to
cities to tax and regulate the same class of businesses
found in Section 10-8-39, 80 Utah Code Ann., 1953.
There is no prohibition against separate jurisdiction
imposing taxes on the same class of taxpayers.

Therefore,

in the absence of facts demonstrating that the City tax
operates to substantially interfere with the functioning of
a state statute or undermine it purpose, this challenge must
fail.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES ARE ENTITLED TO A
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND
CONSTITUTIONALITY. EVERY REASONABLE
CONSTRUCTION WILL BE UTILIZED TO RENDER
AN ORDINANCE AND ITS CLASSIFICATIONS
VALID. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE
CHALLENGER TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THE INVALIDITY OF AN ORDINANCE.

Municipal ordinances, like state statutes, are
presumptively valid.
reasonable

Courts will indulge in every

construction to render the legislative act valid

and constitutional.

Professor McQuillin, in his respected

treatise on municipal corporations, has stated:
No ordinance or law will be declared
unconstitutional unless clearly so, and every
reasonable [effort] will be made to sustain
it. Not only must unconstitutionality appear
clear, but, it has been asserted, it must
appear and be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt . . .
If the constitutional questions
raised are fairly debatable, the court must
declare the ordinance constitutional, as the
court cannot and must not substitute its
judgment for that of the local legislative
body. 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
Section 19.06 at pp. 377-78 (3rd Ed.Rev.);
see also, _Id. Section 19.14.
This Court has adopted this rule of construction.

It held:

It [a city ordinance] should not be held to
be invalid unless it is shown beyond a
reasonable doubt to be incompatible with some
particular constitutional provision. Salt
Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035, 1037
(Utah, 1975), cert. den. 425 U.S. 915, 47
L.Ed.2d 766 (authorities omitted, emphasis
added).
In no other area is this presumptive validity of
statutes and ordinances applied more stringently than in the
area of classification for tax purposes.

New York Rapid

Transportation Corp. v. New York City, 303 U.S. 573, 578, 58
S.Ct. 721, 82 L.Ed. 1024, 1030 (1939); Menlove v. Salt Lake
County, 18 Utah 2d 203, 418 P.2d 227 (Utah 1966); State v.
Taylor, 541 P.2d 1124, 1125 (Utah 1975); Slater v. Salt Lake
City, 1115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, 160 (Utah 1949); See

also, Aldine Apartments Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 426
A.2d 1118, 112-22 (Pa. 1951), holding classifications valid
if it is imposed on some standard capable of reasonable
comprehension, such as the ability to produce income.
This Court has held that such tax law's presumptive
validity is such that the government need not even present
proof of the reasons for its classifications.

Baker v.

Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979).
The United States Supreme Court has explained that this
legislative power to set legislative classifications for tax
purposes is a Separation of Powers issue.

It noted that the

greatest deference should be afforded to the legislatures by
the Courts in this area.

It held:

'In the field of taxation, more than other
fields, the legislature possesses the greatest
freedom in classification, and to attack such as a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment places the
burden on the one attacking them to negate every
conceivable basis which might support the
classification.? Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83,
84 L.Ed. 590 (1940), quoted in C & D Trailer Sales
v. Taxation and Revenue Depart., 604 P.2d 835, 837
(N.M. 1979).
In a recent case, the U.S. Supreme Court noted another
reason for the Courts to give deference to the legislative
taxing classifications.

It noted that it was uniquely the

legislative body's obligation to weigh local factors and
design a balanced tax system.

It observed:

'Traditionally classification has been a
device for fitting tax programs to local
needs and usages in order to achieve an
equitable distribution of the tax burden.

. . . Since the members of a legislature
necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local
conditions which this court cannot have, the
presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the most explicit
demonstration that a classification is a
hostile and oppressive discrimination against
the particular persons and classes.? Reagan
v. Taxation With Representation of
Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547, 76 L.Ed.2d
129, 138 (1980) (footnotes omitted in the
original quotation and emphasis added).
Treatise writers have, similarly, noted the law T s
rightful deference to the legislative branch's power to
define tax classifications.

In sum, these treatise writers

note:
Equal protection of the law permits wide
discretion in classification. 5 McQuillin
Municipal Corporations Section 19.14 at 398;
see also Section 319.13 at 391 (Third Revised
Edition).
The proof must show that the classification
is wholly without any rational basis and is
essentially arbitrary. Id. at 398 (Emphasis
added).
These rulings are not in conflict with the authority
cited by the appellant-Hotels to the effect that the
enabling power to tax is not inferred and that ambiguities
in a taxing statute are construed in favor of the taxpayer.
(Appellant-hotels' brief p. 37). Those concepts are not
disputed by the City, but they are irrelevant to the issues
See also, 5 McQuillin Municipal
Lawrence v. State Tax Commission,
556, 76 L.Ed. 1102 (1932) holding
all that is necessary to adjust a
purposes.

Corporations 41.03 at 267;
286 U.S. 276, 52 S.Ct.
that a reasonable basis is
classification for tax

of this case.

Here, appellants challenge the

constitutionality of the ordinance and the classification
decisions of the City's legislative body.

These direct

challenges to the legislative process are governed by the
presumptions and burdens above discussed, not those dealing
with the grant to enabling power or construction of an
unclear tax law.
The test, then, is whether there exists any reasonable
distinction or differences in the taxed business, its
operations, rights, privileges, public policy or tax policy
to justify the legislative classification.

The burden of

proof is on the challenger to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt the arbitrariness of the classification.

The

government need not present any evidence; that is, the
presumption of validity must be overcome by affirmative
admissible evidence presented by the challenger.
Although this issue was previously extensively briefed
before the lower court, appellant-Hotels have not discussed
these precedents; rather, their brief continues to premise
its arguments on the concept that the tax law
classifications are presumptively suspect.

The appellant-

Hotels have failed to present the required proofs; thus, the
decision of Judge Hanson should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE IMPOSITION OF A ONE PERCENT GROSS
RECEIPTS OCCUPATION OR PRIVILEGE TAX ON
THE PLAINTIFF AND OTHER HOTELS AND

ROOMING HOUSES SIMILARLY SITUATED IS
BASED ON REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL
DISTINCTIONS. AS SUCH, IT IS A VALID
CLASSIFICATION FOR PURPOSE OF RAISING
REVENUE FOR MUNICIPAL PURPOSES.
The precise taxing classification at issue in this case
has already been approved by this Court; it approved, as a
separate class for taxing purposes, innkeepers (hotels,
motels, etc.) providing rental accommodations to persons
occupying rooms for less than 30 days.

Menlove v. Salt Lake

County, 418 P.2d 227 (Utah 1966).
In this case, the Court noted that a county tax (based
on a percentage of gross receipts and imposed for the
purpose of tourist promotion) was a pure revenue producing
measure; as such, it was ruled an occupational privilege
2
tax.
Therefore, the legislative branch of local
government was exercising its revenue-producing prerogative
and the taxing classification was upheld.

In this case, the

Court observed:
Where neither the constitution nor the state
imposes absolute restrictions on the power of
taxation, the courts may not arbitrarily
impose any, unless it clearly appears the tax
imposed is oppressive or clearly and
unreasonably discriminatory, and thus is an
The appellant-Hotels argue the case is dintinguishable
because it was a "special purpose" tax. (Appellants1 brief,
p. 27). That fact was not determinative for the Menlove
court; further, the hotels have failed to find any cases
where any other court found that distinction violated an
innkeeper tax classification. It is a distinction without a
difference and fails to refute all of the other differences
that also justify the classification.

abuse of the taxing power. This court cannot
set up its judgment against that of the
[county] legislature in determining who shall
be required to contribute to the revenues.
Menlove v. Salt Lake County, 418 P.2d 227
(Utah 1966) (Emphasis added).
The Court specifically rejected the argument that the tax
levied on a particular group, for the benefit of all
businesses, rendered it invalid.

In doing so, it quoted

from the United States Supreme Court as follows:
1

The power to make distinction exists with
full vigor in the field of taxation, where no
f
iron rule1 of equality has ever been
enforced upon the states. (citations
omitted) Menlove v. Salt Lake County, supra
at p. 230, citing New York Rapid
Transportation Cor, v. City of New York, 303
U.S. 573, 82 L.Ed. 1024.
The Court also stated:
. . . [T]he Fourteenth Amendment is not a
limitation of a taxing power, unless the
court is compelled to conclude that the act
is so arbitrary that does not involve an
exertion of the taxing power, but constitutes
in substance and effect, a different and
forbidden power, such as, confiscation of
property. The court [United States Supreme
Court] observed that collateral purposes are
motives of the legislature of levying a tax
of a kind what in breach of its lawful powers
or matters beyond the scope of judicial
inquiry. .Id. at p. 231 (Emphasis added).
Appellant-Hotelsf arguments are a rewrite of the rejected
arguments in Menlove and should similarly be rejected.
This conclusion is buttressed, not only by Utah law and the
rationale above stated, but by virtually every decision
involving similar facts which the writer or appellants has
been able to discover.

The following are several cases

involving the precise issue before this Court:

1.

In the case of Edwards v. City of Los Angeles, 119

P.2d 370 (Cal.App. 1941), Los Angeles imposed a gross
receipt's business occupation tax on those persons engaged
in renting or letting any rooms in any hotel, rooming,
boarding house, apartment house for lodging.

The California

Court ruled the classification valid and upheld the tax
against all challenges, including a charge that it was
discriminatory.
2.

In the case of City of Inglewood v. Wright, 364

P.2d 569 (Colo. 1961), a revenue occupation tax computed
from the gross receipts of businesses renting commercial or
residential property within the city was challenged.

It was

upheld against a variety of challenges, including an
assertion that it was an illegal income tax, was
discriminatory, and otherwise constituted an invalid or
unconstitutional classification.
3.

In the case of Chestnut, Inc. v. City of St. Louis,

389 S.W.3d 823 (Mo. 1965), the Missouri Supreme Court upheld
a 2% gross receipts tax virtually identical to the one
before this Court.

Here the gross receipts occupation tax

was levied on the daily rental receipts of hotels from
transient guests, who by definition were those who rented
rooms in hotel or motels for 31 days or less.

Like the case

before the bar, a challenge was made that this
classification was discriminatory and unconstitutional in
view of the fact that other businesses paid on a different

formula; that is, some other businesses paid on fixed or
flat license fee basis as little as $100 and others were
taxed on rates as low as $1.75 per thousand of annual gross
receipts.
The Missouri Court held the legislative
differentiations to be appropriate, constitutional and
reasonable (both with regard to those businesses not paying
a gross receipts tax and to hotels and motels, not catering
to transients); it stated:
A difference in the method of conducting a
business is generally a sound basis for
classification, particularly if it appears
that the tax was fixed in proportion to the
amount of business, which may be determined
by different but reasonable methods.f
(citation omitted) . . . Such division or
classification is recognized generally
throughout the business world; indeed, in the
hotel and apartment trade, the difference
between the business of furnishing living
accommodations of transients and the business
of supplying living accommodations to
permanent guests or tenants is well known and
accepted.T
(citations omitted). It is not
clearly apparent that the tax fixed by the
board of aldermen is arbitrary, unreasonable,
oppressive or prohibitive, virtually
confiscatory or prohibitive of hotel and
motel business, under the rule state in City
of Washington v. Reed citation omitted. Id.
at p. 832 (Emphasis added).
4.

In the City of Portsmouth v. Citizenfs Trust Co.,

222 S.E.2d 532 (Va. 1976), the Court upheld a City gross
receipts business occupation tax levied on those businesses
in the business of renting residential property.
correctly observed:

The Court

. . . [T]he Supreme Court has held that equal
protection does not compel identity of the
treatment but fonly requires that
classification rest on real and not feigned
differences, that distinction has some
relevance to the purpose for which the
classification is made, and that different
treatments not be so disparate, relative to
the difference in classification, as to be
wholly arbitrary.T
(citation omitted).
4
In all of the writer's research, there is only one
case voiding a classification or a gross receipts business
occupation tax on hotels and motels, renting to persons on a
5
transient basis of six months or less.
All other such
decisions have following the Utah Menlove rationale and have
held that such classification was entirely proper and
constitutional.
McQuillin summarizes the holding of these many
decisions, upholding innkeepers as a separate taxing
classification. This treatise observed:
3
For other older cases see upholding the classification of
hotels, motels, etc. and the validity of a gross receipts
tax on them based on differing rates computed on hotel size
see: Cobb v. Durham County, 30 S.E. 338 (N.Carolina, 1898);
Fulgrum v. Nashville, 7610 (8 LEA) 635 (1881); L.A. v.
Landershim, 118 P. 215 (Cal. 1911); see also McBriety v.
Baltimore, 148 A.2d 408 (Mc. 1959) upholding a tax on
rooming houses and multiple family dwellings as a license
tax on housing accommodations; White v. Moore, 46 P.2d 1077
(Ariz. 1935), upholding a business occupation tax.
4
For a virtually complete compilation of all relevant cases
see "Tax on Hotel-Motel Room Occupancy", 58 A.L.R. 4th 274326.
5
Lexington v. Motel Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253
(Ky.Ct.App. 1971) cited at p. 24 of appellant-Hotels' brief.
This case has never been cited by any other court outside
Kentucky and is devoid of supportive authority.

However, hotels and boarding houses of a
specified capacity, furnishing either board
or lodging or both for compensation may be
placed in a separate class, 9 McQuillin
Municipal Corporation Section 26.119 at p.
262-263 (3rd Ed.Rev.) (Emphasis added).
The specific facts before this Court, likewise,
demonstrated that there are numerous reasons to uphold the
City's taxing classifications.

See Statement of Facts 4-11,

supra.
These facts clearly demonstrate a rational reason to
justify the classification.

Therefore, this Court should

follow the Menlove decision and rule that the City's 1%
business occupation tax does not violate equal protection or
due process in its classification.
POINT III
REVENUE LICENSE TAXES ARE NOT ASSESSMENTS OF BENEFITS AND SUCH TAXES ARE
VALID, EVEN IF TAX PAYMENTS EXCEED THE
VALUE OF GOVERNMENTAL SERVICES RECEIVED.
In Point I of appellant-Hotels1 brief, they have
continued an erroneous line of logic from their lower court
arguments, which wrongly mixes cases dealing with regulatory
and impact fees, confiscatory taxation and per se tax
classification issues.

Their argument stirs this, mostly,

unrelated mix of authorities with an assertion that
discovery was improperly limited by the lower court; thus,
they argue factual issues exist which preclude summary
Point 1A and B, appellant-Hotels' brief at pp. 13-25.

j udgment.
However, the legal theories (for which they seek
discovery or upon which they assert disputed material
factual issues exist) do not state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, as a matter of law.

The following point

will discuss these issues.
A-

APPELLANT-HOTELS' AUTHORITIES WRONGLY
CONFUSE REGULATORY AND FEE CASES WITH
CITY POWER TO IMPOSE REVENUE LICENSE
TAXES.

To properly analyze appellant-Hotels1 argument, it must
first be noted that there is a significant legal distinction
between a license "revenue" measure and a "regulatory" one.
McQuillin correctly summarizes the law as follows:
License fees for regulation must bear a
reasonable relation to the expense of
regulation, as discussed in detail in the
following section. However, this rule has no
application to license fees or taxes enacted
under the taxing powers for revenue purposes.
9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations Section
26.35 at p. 76 (3rd Ed.Rev.) (Emphasis
added).
Utah recognized this distinction of "regulation" versus
"revenue" licensing as early as 1898.

In this case, the

Utah court upheld a revenue occupation tax on telephone
companies imposed by Ogden, under the predecessor statute
10-8-39 Utah Code Ann., 1953.

It observed:

It is held that the municipality is not
limited to the mere expense of the
regulation, but it may impose a reasonable
license tax for the purpose of obtaining
revenue necessary to meet the general
expenses of such municipality. Ogden City v.

Crossmanf 53 P. 985r 989 (Utah 1898)
(Emphasis added); see also, Salt Lake City v.
Christensen Co,, 95 P. 523 (Utah 1908).
Appellants have ignored this distinction and wrongly
argue against the legality of this revenue tax from
7
regulatory or impact fee cases.
Admittedly in such cases,
the correct rule of law is that the regulatory fee must
reasonably relate to the cost of regulation.

However, as

above noted, that limitation is not applicable to revenue
tax assessments, like the case at bar.

The cases cited do

not stand for the proposition asserted; that is, that a
City's revenue tax can be challenged by comparing the costs
of services to taxes paid.
Salt Lake City v. Utah Light and Railway, 45 Utah 50
Q

142 P. 1067 (1914) cited by appellants
license dispute.

is a "revenue"

However, in that suit the issue was

whether a taxing classification distinction based only on
See: Weber Basin Home Builders Assn. v. Roy City, 487
P.2d 866 (Utah 1971), cited at appellant-Hotels1 brief at p.
15, 20. This case is a building permit fee dispute where
developers argued development permit assessment were not
reasonably related to the cost of regulation. Banberry
Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah
1981), cited at appellant-Hotels' brief p. 21. Similarly,
this case is a development impact fee assessment imposed as
a condition for a water connection and subdivision plat
approval, not a revenue tax assessment. Call v. City of
West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1908), cited at appellantHotels1 brief at p. 21. In this case, the City imposed a 7%
land donation requirement as an impact assessment as a
condition for City development approvals to develop parks
and flood control.
Appellant-Hotels1 brief at p. 22.

whether electrical service was metered or unmetered was
without a "rational basis."

The Court held:

But in limiting the tax to those who use
meters for the purpose mentioned in the
ordinance destroys its uniformity, Id. at p.
1071.
The dicta quoted by appellants is not illuminative to the
issues or many distinctions of innkeeper's business present
9
m this case.
Likewise, the 1900 case of Cache County v. Jensen, 21
Utah 207, 61 P. 303 (1900) is unavailing to appellants. 10
That case interpreted a County enabling statute and found
the legislature had not granted them power to issue a
revenue license tax.

The Court noted that taxing authority

would not be inferred and that the County only had
"regulatory" powers,

^d. at p. 306, 307.

The Cache

holding relates only to the statutory provisions of counties
and is not relevant to the issues of this City taxation
case.

9
See Statement of Facts Nos. 4-11, supra and Discussion in
Point II, supra.
Appellant-Hotels' brief, p. 17.
This Court subsequently affirmed the difference of county
and city enabling powers to impose business revenue license
taxes. Cf. Section 17-5-27 Utah Code Ann, and Mountain
States Tel, and Tel. Co. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 113
(Utah 1985) (County enabling authority) with broader city
taxing power illustrated by Mountain States Tel, and Tel.
Co. v. Salt Lake City, supra and granted powers in Section
10-8-39, 80 Utah Code Ann.

Lastly, the City has no quarrel with the general
proposition that classifications of taxpayers must be based
on rational distinctions.

However, that principle is

entirely different from equating the amount of taxes paid to
the benefits received.

When on applies the correct body of

case law dealing with "revenue" licensing (as opposed to
"regulatory" fees) appellant-Hotels* authority for its
argument to equate tax payments with service delivery
evaporates.

The lower court ruling was correct and should

be affirmed.
B.

THERE ARE NO DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACT JUSTIFYING A REMAND BECAUSE TAX
PAYMENTS ARE NOT AN ASSESSMENT OF
BENEFITS.

Much of the appellant-Hotels1 argument before the lower
court and that underpinning their claim before this Court is
predicated on their interpretation of Continental Bank and
Trust v. Farmington City, 599 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1979). 1 2
Appellant-Hotels claim that a factual dispute exists and
assert the right to further discovery based on the theory
that a taxpayer can claim discrimination and
unconstitutional taxation, if it pays more taxes than it
receives in back governmental services.

The law is to the

contrary and Continental Bank does not so hold.

See appellant-Hotels1 brief, p. 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22,
33.

First, it must be noted that Courts consistently and
uniformly held that there is no requirement that the
benefits received by a taxpayer must equate to the taxes
paid.

The United States Supreme Court held as follows:
T

A tax is not an assessment of benefits.
. . . The only benefit to which the taxpayer
is constitutionally entitled is that derived
from the enjoyment of the privilege of living
in an organized society, established and
safeguarded by the devotion of taxes to
public purposes. . . . T Carmichael v.
Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 52223, 81 L.Ed. 1245 (1937), quoted in Tiffany
Const. Co., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 603
P.2d 632, 634-35 (N.M. 1979) (Emphasis
added).
The Supreme Court, further, observed:
"The Fourteenth Amendment does not require
taxes to be levied according to benefits
received by the person or entity . . .
[paying them]. Missouri Pac. Railroad v.
Road District, 266 U.S. 187, 69 L.Ed. 237
(1924) (Emphasis added).
McQuillin summarizes this universal principle applicable to
all general revenue taxation (as opposed to regulatory or
fee assessments) as follows:
So it is immaterial that no benefit is
derived by the taxpayer from the payment of
taxes, or that he is less benefited than
others who pay the same or less tax. 16
McQuillin, Municipal Corporation, Id. at
Section 44.50 at p. 110 (3rd Rev.Ed.)
(Emphasis added); see also Id.. Section 44.47.
Utah has specifically upheld this view of the law in a
case virtually identical to the one before the Court.

Like

the case before this Court, hotels asserted that a gross
receipts tax was unreasonable and arbitrary because they did
not obtain measurable benefits; this Court held:

A tax is not an assessment of benefits.f
(citation omitted) Taxes are repeatedly
imposed on a group or class without regard to
the responsibility for the creation of relief
of the conditions to be remedies. . . .
There is no need to be a relationship between
a class of taxpayers and the purpose of the
appropriation. Menlove v. Salt Lake^County,
supra at p. 230. (Emphasis added).
The Continental Bank case holding and rationale is not
to the contrary.

In this case, a single taxpayer which was

really a separate enclave and provided essentially all of
its own municipal services, but was singled out for
oppressive taxation.

Significant to the Court was the fact

that this sole business "shoulders the (tax) burden alone. .
."

Ld. at p. 1245.

Also, important was the fact that the

business operated on a low profit margin, payed no
dividends, was heavily in debt and the assessment
represented a ". . . potentially crippling tax on a single
business for the benefit of the community as a whole

..."

Id. at p. 1246 (Emphasis added).
The Continental Bank case is factually poles apart from
the case at bar.

There, the City (in a sham classification

really comprised of a single taxpayer) established tax rates

For other authority holding that a revenue taxing measure
need not bear any relationship to the cost or the amount of
services delivered to the taxes entity. See: 9 McQuillin
Section 26-35 at p. 76 (3rd Rev.Ed.); Ogden City v.
Crossman, 53 P. 985, 989 (Utah 1898); Blue Top Motel v. City
of Stevens Point, 320 N.W.2d 172 (Wis. 1982); Edwards v.
City of L.A., 119 P.2d 370, 372 (Cal.App. 1942); Chestnut
Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 389 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985).

near the limits of economic survival and required that
business to fund a major portion of the City budget.

To the

contrary in the case at bar, the class of taxpayers includes
over 100 hotels and motels which each receive a full
umbrella of health, safety and other City services.

Each

contributes to and feeds off of the City's economic
environment in a unique way; the City's innkeepers are not
an isolated self-contained sub-community as was that
taxpayer.

(See Statement of Facts and discussion in Point

II, supra)«
Neither are the innkeepers oppressively taxed to the
point of extinction.

It is interesting that of the 100

businesses within the class, all but these two appellants
have not pursued a challenge to the tax.

That lack of

participation hardly suggests the oppression and
discrimination required by case law as illegal and
confiscatory taxation.
Further, the Continental Bank case does not uphold
appellant-Hotels' suggestion that the Due Process Clause
invites the Court to compare benefits received with taxes
paid; by close analysis, it is really a confiscatory tax
case.

It does not support appellant-Hotels' premises that

the lower court erred in dismissing the case and granting
Utah Power and Light Company's Motion for a Protective Order
against discovery.

It must be noted that before the lower court, the
Hotels argued that Summary Judgment should not be granted,
and proffered evidence that they wanted to compare tax
payments made by innkeepers with services and taxes paid by
others in the downtown area.

14

In their brief, filed with

this Court, they similarly argue error because they want to
compare " . . . taxes paid to benefits received."

15

As above

argued, this analysis is not a claim or theory upon which
they may legally challenge this tax.
The discovery against which Utah Power & Light was
protected went to the this issue:

The Hotel sought the

amount of franchise taxes paid by all innkeepers through
that utility.

Appellant-Little America sought privileged,

sensitive and confidential information about competitorsf
business operations; further, it was burdensome and

14
See Answer to City's Third Set of Interrogatories, p. 2,
wherein the appellant, Little America states:
"[It] intends to proffer evidence . . . as to
the tax burden imposed on [it] . . . in
comparison with those imposed on average
residents . . . or owners of other commercial
property in a downtown area." (Emphasis
added)
15
Appellant-Hotels1 brief, p. 25.
It should be noted that the affidavit of Mr. Norman was
the subject of an objection, which the lower court never
ruled upon because, even accepting the foundationless
opinions, summary judgment was proper, as a matter of law.
(R-870-75).

oppressive to the utility.

However, more importantly, the

information would add nothing to the suit, except the amount
of total taxes paid for appellants' invalid theory that a
comparison of benefits to tax payments was important.
It is respectfully submitted that appellant-Hotels1
extenuated argument concerning its asserted lack of benefits
in comparison to the amount of taxation paid by them is
irrelevant and immaterial.

Those arguments may have some

applicability to a challenge alleging confiscatory taxation;
however, that cause of action has not been pled.

Therefore,

the lower court's rulings on discovery and its summary
judgment should be affirmed.
C.

THE CITY'S HOTEL OCCUPATION TAX IS NOT
CONFISCATORY OR CONSTITUTIONALLY
OPPRESSIVE.

The United States Supreme Court, Utah and virtually
every other state decision is clear that establishing a tax
rate is purely a legislative function

The Courts are loath

to question the reasonableness or the amount of a tax, so
long as it is not an assessment beyond the legitimate needs
Appellant-Little America's first subpoena was quashed on
objection by Utah Power and Light Company. A second
subpoena duces tecum was more generic as to the general
class of innkeepers in an effort to avoid privilege and
confidentiality concerns. However, it was still burdensome
and the information ruled irrelevant because it only went to
the issue of an assessment of benefits tax theory, properly
rejected by the learned District Judge. See, first
Protective Order and Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment
and Granting Protective Order (R-1141 attached as Appendix
"4").

of the taxing entity or does not constitute an abuse of the
taxing power, by being tantamount to a confiscation of
private property.

16 McQuillin Municipal Corporations,

Section 44.25 at p. 65.

The United States Supreme Court

held:
'Except in rare and special cases, the due
process of law contained in the Fifth
Amendment is not a limitation on the taxing
power conferred upon congress by the
Constitution . . .
An no reason exists for
applying a different rule against the state
in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment . . .
That clause is applicable to a taxing statute
such as the one here assailed only if the act
be so arbitrary as to compel a conclusion
that is not involved in exertion of the
taxing power, but constitutes in substance
and effect, a direct exertion of a different
and forbidden power, as, for example, the
confiscation of property. Marnano Co. v.
Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 78 L.Ed. 1109 (1934).
Likewise, our Supreme Court observed:
. . . by granting the power [power to tax]
the legislature imposed upon the city council
the discretion to determine just how far they
could go within the limits imposed, . . . as
to be the best judge of the necessities.
. . . In such cases the council [city
legislative body] and not the court, is the
proper repository of the public trust; . . .
Under the circumstances, the court ought not
to interfere upon the ground that the
ordinance is unreasonable, but is restricted
to the constitutionality of the act granting
the power. Ogden v. Crossman, supra, at p.
989 (Emphasis added).
In measuring when the "line-of-abuse" has been crossed,
this Court and many others have stated that the facts must
demonstrate that the tax was beyond the City's needs or
would destroy the taxed business class.

This Court stated

that a city lacked the power to tax, only when it acted:

• • • Beyond the necessities of the city, or
. . . one so excessive as to prohibit or
destroy the occupation or business upon
which it is imposed." Ogden v. Crossman,
supra at p. 989 (Emphasis added).
Other Courts considering this issue have similarly ruled.
For example the Washington Supreme Court upheld a 2-1/2%
gross receipts business or occupation tax on those selling
fuel oil, when they complained they were unfairly
discriminated against by virtue of a parallel 5% occupation
tax on natural gas, electrical and telephone suppliers.

It

held:
Therefore, for a tax to be declared invalid,
it must be shown that it actually tends to
destroy as a whole the business, industry, or
entity which is being taxed. It is not
enough that the tax imposes an unpleasant or
heavy financial burden on individual
operators or the industry as a whole. To be
invalid, a tax must be so oppressive or
unreasonable as to amount to a confiscation
or destruction of the business being taxed.
The Oil Heat Institute of Washington v. Town
of Mulilteo, 498 Jg2d 864, 866 (Wash. 1972)
(Emphasis added).
The case at bar presents no facts where the hotel
industry is going to be subject to the confiscation of
property, under the standard enunciated by these many
Courts.

Further, the facts are not in dispute that the tax

was imposed to meet City needs and not in excess of budget.
Accord: Koffman v. City of Tucson, 433 P.2d 282, 286
(Ariz. 1967); Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S.
369, 41 L.E.2d 132, 137, upholding a 20% gross receipts tax
on commercial parking business, even if the tax destroyed
particular businesses.

Therefore, the Summary Judgment granted by the lower
court against the appellant-Hotels was proper.

The

appellant-Hotels have failed in fact and law to establish a
claim of a City abuse of its taxing power sufficient to
constitute an "oppressive" or "confiscatory" tax, which
violates due process or equal protection principles of the
U.S. or State Constitutions.
POINT IV
THE LICENSE TAX IMPOSED ON THE CLASS OF
TRANSIENT ROOM PROVIDERS BY THE CITY IS
WITHIN THE CITYfS ENABLING POWER AND IS
NOT AN ILLEGAL INCOME OR SALES TAX.
A.

UTAH ENABLING POWER AUTHORIZES THE CITY
TO ADOPT A GROSS RECEIPTS OCCUPATION
TAX.

State law specifically provides:
They [cities] may raise revenue by levying
and collecting a license fee or tax on any
business within the limits of the City, and
regulate the same by ordinance; . . . 10-880 Utah Code Ann., 1953 (Emphasis added).
It also clearly authorizes cities to tax hotels; the law
provides"
They [cities] may license, [and] tax . . .
hotels and other public places, boarding
houses, . . . lodging houses . . . and all
others pursuing like occupations. . . . 108-39 Utah Code Ann., 1953 (Emphasis added).
In construing this specific grant of power, this Court
has ruled that cities have the power to impose an occupation
tax computed from the gross receipts of the business.
Davis v. Ogden City, 215 P.2d 616, 621 (Utah 1950).

Specifically, with regard to the appellants' claim,
this Court held:
An occupation tax does not become an income
tax [or a sales tax] because the amount
levied is based on gross income. Id. at p.
624 (Emphasis added).
Subsequently, the Utah Supreme Court again upheld the
per se validity of a Salt Lake City ordinance levying a
gross receipts tax on a business, under enabling power
granted in Section 10-8-80.

In so ruling, the Court stated:

"On its face the taxing scheme is . . . constitutional . . . "

Mountain States Tel. & Tel, v. Salt Lake

City, 596 P.2d 649, 652 (Utah 1979).
B.

THE LICENSE TAX IS NOT A SALES OR INCOME
TAX.

The recognition that a gross receipts tax has not
become an illegal income tax or sales tax by virtue of its
tax on gross receipts is also virtually uniformly upheld in
other jurisdictions.

McQuillin states as follows:

The power to license for revenue as well as
police purposes may be conferred upon the
municipal corporation.

19
Accord: Town v. Hackleburg v. Northwest Alabama Gas
District, 277 Atlanta 355, 170 So.2d 792 (Ala. 1964);
National Biscuit Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 197 P.2d 788
(Cal. 1948); In Re 320 West Thirty-Seventh Street Inc., 22
N.E.2d 313 (N.Y. 1939) holding a gross receipt based
business tax not a sales tax.

The amount of the license tax or fees may be
based on the amount of business done or sales
made, measured by gross sales, gross receipts
or gross income. 9 McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations, Section 26.30 at p. 62, Section
26.37 at p. 83 (Emphasis added); see also,
Id. Section 44.12, p. 32; Section 44.190, p.
475.
This work further summarizes a large body of law regarding
the gross receipts tax as follows:
The term [gross receipts tax] while amply
descriptive of the methods of computation, is
of no significance in determining the nature
of the exaction imposed in any particular tax
legislation.

A gross receipts tax is not invalid as a tax
on income or on property. McQuillin, Id., at
Section 44.192 at p. 490. (Emphasis added).
See also P. Lorillard Co. v. Seattle, 83
Wash.2d 586, 521 P.2d 208 (1974).
Thus, the law is virtually uniform in holding that a gross
receipt tax is not a sales or income tax.
Specifically, those jurisdictions considering the issue
before this Court concerning the validity of gross receipt
taxes on rooming houses or hotels have held them valid
against challenges that they were illegal sales or other
types of taxes, not within the taxing authority of the City.
For example, a 1982 decision by the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin upheld a 4% gross receipt business occupation tax,

computed income derived from innkeepers, providing rooming
accommodations for transient guests staying for less than a
month.

The Court upheld the City tax against challenges it

was an illegal income tax and beyond the City's enabling
power.

It held:

"We hold that the City can use the gross
receipts as the basis by which to determine
the room tax." Blue Top Motel v. City of
Stevens Point, 320 N.W.2d 172 (Wis. 1982).
For other cases see:

Edwards v. City of Los Angeles, 119

P.2d 370, 372 (Cal.App. 1941); Chestnut, Inc. v. City of St.
20
Louis, 389 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1965),
upholding a two percent
gross receipts tax on daily rental receipts received on
hotel from transient guests; Green v. Panama City Housing
Authority, 110 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1959) cited at 93 A.L.R.2d
1140, holding a gross receipts room rental tax was ruled to

20
Appellant-Hotels cite a 1979 Missouri case that a 1%
gross receipt tax was an illegal sales tax imposed by a city
at page 42 of their brief. That case did not overrule
Chestnut and did not hold that a business occupation tax
based on gross receipts was illegal. Here, a tax on food
and drink transaction was held to be a sales tax because of
the way the tax was structured, which taxed net sales to the
customer. The court, however clearly notes: "This case
does not concern a municipality's power to enact such a
[gross receipts business occupation] tax." Suzy's Bar &
Grill, Inc. v. Kansas City, 580 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Mo. 1979)

be an excise and not an income tax;

State v. Heymann, 115

So. 101 (La. 1933), a one percent tax on income from
receipts earned on the rental of office buildings was ruled
to be an excise and not an income tax or property tax; Dicks
v. Naff, 500 S.W.2d 350 (Ark. 1973), upholding 1% gross
22
receipt tax on hotels and restaurants.
Appellant-Hotels cite the Lexington v. Motel
Developers, Inc. case for the proposition that a gross
receipt business tax (like Salt Lake City's) is per se void
The appellant-Hotels cite at p. 42 of this Brief a lower
court of appeals Florida case, affirmed by the Florida
Supreme Court, which held void a $10.00 tax on the sales of
motore vehicles on each $1,000 of value, reduced to $1.00 on
sales over $3,000. The court here found significant that
the ordinance taxed "sales" not gross receipts. Those facts
have little or nothing in common with the facts and
ordinance here under discussion. Birdsong Motors, Inc. v.
Tampa, 235 S.2d 318 (D.Ct.App. Fla. 1970) aff f d 261 So.2d 1
(Fla. 1972).
At page 40 and 46 of appellant-Hotels' brief, they cite
Minturn v. Foster Lumber Co., 548 P.2d 1276 (Colo. 1976) for
the proposition that all gross receipt occupation license
taxes are illegal income taxes. Interestingly, the court
cites with approval City of Inglewood v. Wright, 364 P.2d
569 (Colo. 1961) which upheld a tax computed at $4.00 per
room. This case was (in reality) a gross receipt or a
property tax, which was ruled beyond the City's enabling
power. It correctly ruled that this tax was not an income
or a property tax, but a legal occupation license tax. A
room charge of $4.00 can be translated to a percentage of
the rental, but Minturn discussion fails to discuss this
issue. Minturn stands alone and without acceptance by any
other reported decision. It is specifically in
contradiction to Utah law and the vast majority of other
decisions approving occupation license fees, determined by a
percentage of gross receipts.
22
Case cited erroneously by appellants at p. 35 of their
brief as supporting contrary position.

as a sales tax.

Contrary to the implication in

appellants1 brief, that case, holds that the gross receipts
business occupation tax for hotels was not void as a sales
tax.

It expressly stated of the 5% license tax on room

rentals:
"We conclude the tax here under consideration
properly may be characterized as a
permissible license tax which the City of
Lexington may impose on a business and is not
an excise [sales] tax which cities . . . are
not empowered to levy." Lexington v. Motel
Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253, 256
(Emphasis added), voiding the tax on an
invalid classification, which issue was
discussed supra.
The other cases cited in appellant-Hotels' brief on this
point likewise do not stand for the proposition asserted or

See page 41 of appellant-Hotels' brief, quoting a
position from a concurring judge expressing a concurring
opinion, expressly rejected by the majority.

are clearly distinguishable.
The uncontroverted facts demonstrate that the tax in
question was intended to be and has all the incidents of a
privilege or occupation Business Revenue Tax.
is called and passed as a license tax; (b)

(a)

The tax

The tax on

innkeepers is imposed on the party engaged in business, not
the consumer for the privilege of doing business in the

In Columbus v. Atlanta Cigar Co., Inc., 143 S.E.2d 416
(Ct.App.Ga. 1965), cited at p. 42 of appellant-Hotels1
brief, the court specifically approved of business
occupation taxes computed on gross receipts. It noted that
its holding prohibiting sales tax impositions by the City"
" . . . shall not be construed to apply to a . . . occupation
or franchise tax based on gross receipts or on a gross
receipts basis." Id. at p. 418 (Emphasis added). In that
case the court found that a 2 cent tax on each 20 cigarettes
possessed by anyone was preempted by a state statute.
Further: "It is clear that the tax . . . [is not] imposed on
one for the privilege of doing business . . ., but is a
sales or use tax imposed on individual transactions . . . "
Id. at p. 418. (Emphasis added).
In City of Homer v. Gangl, 650 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1982), cited
at page 43 of appellant-Hotels' brief, the question of sales
versus license tax was not even at issue. The city, through
a special referendum vote, passed a 5% transient room tax
under its perceived general revenue taxing powers; it was
not structured or even asserted to be an occupation license
tax. The room tax was based on the: "actual rental of a
room, and imposed, computed and collected according to
traditional sales tax methods . . . "
Id., at p. 399. It was
structured as a tax on each transaction and not on the
privilege of doing business; as such, it was held void as a
sales tax. Appellants1 assertion that the tax was "similar"
to Salt Lake's tax is simply untrue.
For a discussion SuzyTs Bar & Grill, Inc. v. W.F. Jensen
Candy Co., and Eugene Theatre Co., Coos Bay, Birdsong
Motors, Inc. See footnotes 20, and 21, supra.

City;

(c) In computation of gross receipts, there is no

deduction permitted for any operating expenses or any
included excise taxes on products used;

and (d) It is

irrelevant to the City if the tax is included in the cost of
appellant-Hotels' operation or surcharged to their patrons.
See Statement of Facts; Chapter 30, Title 20 Revised
Appellant-Hotels suggest that the fact that the tax is
assessed against the business is irrelevant in
distinguishing a sales tax from an authorized occupation or
privilege license tax. Page 40 of appellant-Hotels? brief.
However, every case on the subject, including those cited by
appellants, note this factor as relevant distinction.
Sales taxes are on imposed individual "transactions" and
ordinarily assessed by statutory authorization at the point
of sale to the consumer. Similarly, the Utah Code dealing
with sales taxes provides: "The word 'tax' means the tax
payable by the purchaser . . . or the aggregate amount of
taxes due from the vendor . . . "
Utah law imposes the sales
tax "upon every retail sales" and the law specifically
requires collection at the point of sale; it says vendors
" . . . shall be responsible for the collection of the amount
of the [sales] tax imposed on the sale [transaction]." 5915-2, 4, 5; 11-1-1 et seq. Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended
(Emphasis added).
By contrast, license taxes are imposed on business receipts.
That distinction is a major "incident" to demonstrate the
difference between a sales and a license tax. The fact that
the vendor is liable, if he does not collect the tax is
irrelevant to the structure or "incidents" of these
different taxes.
Appellant-Hotels assert no new privilege was conferred by
the change in the rate structure for the occupation tax.
Page 41 of appellant's brief. Tax rates continually change;
the Utah Supreme Court specifically held cities had the
power to increase license tax rates in Mt. States Tel. &
Tel, v. Ogden City, 487 P.2d 849 (Utah 1971). AppellantHotels' privilege to do business in Salt Lake is contingent
on paying license fees and their ipse dixit statement to the
contrary is not supported by any law or facts known to this
writer and appellant-Hotels have cited none.

Ordinances of Salt Lake City, attached as Appendix "8".
The tax is not a "sales tax" because it taxes the
business for the privilege of operating within the City and
is not a tax on the "transaction" assessed against the
consumer, based on the value of the service or commodity
received.

It is not an "income tax" because it lacks the

incidents of this type of a tax, such as taxing "net"
income, generally on a progressive rate basis.

The tax is

what it facially purports to be; it is a privilege or
occupation privilege revenue tax on a distinct class of
businesses and should be upheld.
POINT V
CITY'S ORDINANCE HAS NOT BEEN PREEMPTED
BY STATE LAW.
Appellant-Hotels contend
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that the City tax is

preempted under the State enabling statute which allowed
County governments to establish recreation, tourist and
convention bureaus.

See 17-31-1 et seq. Utah Code Ann.,

1953, Chapter 12 of Title 59 Utah Code Ann., 1953.

The

following point will demonstrate the fallacy of this
assertion.

Also see, Kansas City v. John Deere Co., 577 S.W.2d 633
(Mo.); United Airlines, Inc. v. Joseph, 121 N.Y.S.2d 692;
Evers v. Daveville, 61 S.2d 78 each holding that a gross
receipts business occupation tax was not a "sales tax."
See p. 47 of appellant-Hotels? brief.

It is undisputed that where a state has preempted a
legislative field, including taxation, local government may
not intrude into the area.

Antieau, Municipal Corporation

Law, Vol. 2A Section 21.10; 16 McQuillin, Municipal
Corporations Section 44.190a at p. 477.
However, Antieau also correctly summarizes many cases
by stating:
A state tax regulatory in nature does not
ordinarily preclude a municipal tax levied
for revenue. Even when a state has occupied
a field by regulation, local governments can
generally tax businesses carried on within
their boundaries and enforce such taxes by
requiring business license taxes for revenue.
Id. Section 21.10
In the case before the bar, however, there exist a
specific grant of power for cities to pass occupation taxes
and express Utah case law which permits the tax to be
computed on gross receipts.29 Therefore, appellant-Hotels'
challenge must be premised on an "implied" preemption.

In

deciding such issues, Courts attempt to determine "intent"
of the State legislature.

Speaking to this issue of

preemption, this Court noted of the power of local
governments to adopt ordinances as follows:
A state cannot empower local governments to
do that which the state itself does not have
authority to do. In addition, local
governments are without authority to pass any
ordinance prohibited by, or in conflict with,
state statutory law. (citation omitted)
See 10-9-39, 80 Utah Code Ann, and discussion supra.

Also an ordinance is invalid if it intrudes
into an area which the Legislature has
preempted by comprehensive legislation
intended to blanket a particular field.
State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1121
(Utah 1980) (Emphasis added).
In a leading case, our sister state, Alaska, recently
considered an issue similar to the one before the bar and
articulated these principles.

Liberati v. Bristol Bay

Burrough, 584 P.2d 1115 (Ala. 1978).

In this case, a

municipality levied a 3% gross receipts tax on all fish
caught within the Burrough of Bristol Bay.

The state had

already imposed a 3% tax on fisheries, a part of which tax
was shared with Alaska municipalities.
Fishermen contested the tax, among other reasons,
charging that it constituted an illegal severance tax.
Specifically, they complained that the city tax was
preempted by the state tax on the same income on the sale of
fish.

Alternatively, they argued specific commodity sales

tax, outside the city's taxation power and preempted by
state law.
The Court rejected each of these arguments and held
(similar to State v. Hutchinson, supra) that Alaska cities
did not follow the archaic Dillon Rule of strict
construction.

After noting general statutory authority for

city taxation, the Alaska Court discussed the issue of
preemption.

It noted:

Merely because the state has enacted
legislation concerning a particular subject

does not mean that all municipal power to act
on the same subject is lost. . . . only
where an ordinance substantially interferes
with the effective functioning of a state
statute or regulation or its underlying
purpose. Id. at p. 1122.
It also held:
In view of the constitutional and statutory
commandment that municipal power be broadly
interpreted in Alaska, we adopt the view that
there is no general prohibition against like
municipal and state taxes. Id. at p. 1122
(Emphasis added); see also, 56 Am.Jur.
"Municipal Corporations" Section 374 at p.
408.
The strong presumption of validity of municipal
ordinances requires that the "preemption" by the state be
clearly manifest before it can be held the powers of cities
has been withdrawn.
(Kan. 1975);

Junction City v. Lee, 532 P.2d 1292

Klimet v. Ghent, 423 NYS 2d 517 (NY 1979).

Also preemption cannot apply where there exists no conflict.
56 Am.Jur. Municipal Corporations Section 374 at p. 409,
411.
Consistent with this clear law, Utah has upheld a 6%
gross receipt business occupation tax on public utilities,
regulated by the Public Service Commission against a
challenge that cities were preempted by the State regulatory
scheme.

Mountain States Tel, and Tel, v. Ogden, supra.

^0
See also, 72 Harvard L.Rev. "Conflict Between State
Statutes and Municipal Ordinances" 737, 745 (1959) (Emphasis
added); see also: Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151, 55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978).

Based on similar principles, other Courts have also
upheld City gross receipts tax on amusement businesses,
holding they were not preempted by State sales tax laws.
Estelle Realty, Inc. v. City of Mayfield Heights, 199 N.E.2d
875 (Ohio 1964).

They held that the gross receipts tax is

not in conflict with the corporate tax or foreign
corporation franchise tax.

National Biscuit Co. v. City of

Philadelphia, 98 A.2d 183 (Pa. 1953).
Thus, it can be summarized that preemption occurs
where:

(a) There is an express prohibition by State

statute, or (b) the taxing scheme would substantially
interfere or make impossible the performance of a state
revenue producing or regulatory undertaking.

None of these

conditions exist or are alleged in the case before the bar.
The State statutes here in question does not even
concern itself with State regulation or with producing
revenue for the State of Utah.

Rather, it is merely an

enabling statute permitting counties of the state to raise
money (if they so choose) for the promotion of recreation,
tourist and convention bureaus.31

This permissive authority

31
The law urged to be precursive by the Appellant-Hotels
specifically provides that it is not mandatory; it states of
its purpose that:
" . . . the method of financing such bureaus
is not exclusive or mandatory." See title of
the act quoted in the annotation of 17-31-1
Utah Code Ann., 1953.
It also has no more dignity or effect than that granting
City enabling authority under 10-8-39 Utah Code Ann., 1953.

to raise funds certainly demonstrates a lack of any
"manifest" legislative intent to preempt City taxing
authority.
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that business
occupation tax does not substantially interfere with or
preclude state regulatory purpose or function and the City
tax should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
The City has clear enabling authority for a gross
receipts business occupation revenue tax under Sections 108-39 and 80 Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

Further, computing a

business license tax based on gross receipts of a business
does not render it a impermissible sales or income tax.

The

City has not been preempted from the imposition of a license
when the State granted counties the power to,
simultaneously, tax the same businesses.
classification
constitutional.

Since the tax

is based on rational distinctions, it is
The lower court's Summary Judgment should

be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of February,

1988.

ROGER F. CUTLER
Salt Lake City Attorney
Attorney for Respondent
RFC:cc
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE Hft^TTD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, et al.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. C-82-5220

Plaintiffs,
vs .
SALT LAKE CITY, et al. ,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on cross Motions for
Summary Judgment between the various plaintiffs and the defendants
Also before the Court are cross Motions to Strike all or portions
of affidavits filed by the respective parties in support of or
in opposition to the Motions for Summary Judgment.

This matter

was extensively briefed and argued by the parties' respective
counsel.

Following argument, the Court took the matter under

advisement and has now considered further the oral arguments
made by counsel for the respective parties, the exhaustive
Memoranda submitted by all parties, reviewed the cases cited by
the parties, and has conducted further independent research on
the questions and issues raised.

ooo^ic
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

The Court is now fully advised on the issues, and therefore
enters the following Memorandum Decision.
The Court declines to deal individually or in depth with
the multitude of legal issues raised by the various parties,
inasmuch as the legal Memoranda of the respective parties
accomplish that task in an extremely adequate fashion, and to
restate those legal arguments here would only tend to unduly
lengthen this Memorandum Decision.
With regard to some of the issues raised by the parties,
the Court is satisfied that the application of proper law and
proper legal analysis allows this Court to make disposition
of those issues as a matter of law.

Other issues, however,

necessarily encompass disputed material issues of fact that
under the rules applicable to motions for summary judgment,
prohibit determination as a matter of law, and require full
resolution of those contested issues of fact by.a trier of fact.
The Court is of the opinion that the affidavits to which
objections have been raised, should be allowed, for purposes
of these Motions, at least for determination as to the weight
to be given to the statements offered by the various affiants.
The Court is mindful of the potential foundational difficulties
that exist in some or all of the affidavits, and has considered
those potential foundational problems in determining the weight

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL, ET AL
VS. SALT LAKE CITY, ET AL
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to be given to the respective affidavits.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
The cross Motions

to Strike affidavits (referred to by the defendant as "Objections'1)
are denied.

The Court has considered the affidavits in light of

the above standards and even giving the appropriate weight to
the affidavits, the affidavits lead this Court to the inescapable
conclusion that a portion of the issues raised in the respective
Motions for Summary Judgment contain material questions of fact
prohibiting disposition of this case as a matter of law.
The Court concludes, based upon the undisputed facts or
upon those facts where no "substantial" disputed facts exist,
and upon application of the legal authorities urged by the
defendants, which the Court accepts as proper and appropriate
under the circumstances of this case, that Summary Judgment in
part as suggested above, is appropriate.

The Court finds in

favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs on all legal
issues raised by the pleadings and Motions, together with those
suggested in the supporting Memoranda, with the exception of the
issue of "classification" and whether or not such a classification
is arbitrary and/or discriminatory.

A determination of the issue

of the reasonableness of the classification under the circumstances of this case must be based on the facts as they may
eventually be found by a trier of fact.

The affidavits,

considered in the light set out above, make clear that contested
issues of fact remain for ultimate resolution at trial on the
classification issue.

O00?-)l-
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The legal authorities and positions urged by the plaintiffs
regarding the validity of the defendant Salt Lake City's ordinance
other than the "classification" issue are not, in the Court's
judgment well taken or are otherwise not applicable in this case.
While the plaintiffs attempt to raise fact

questions in

some limited areas in their Reply Memorandum, for example:
interference with interstate commerce, there exists no "genuine
issue of material fact" so as to prohibit Summary Judgment on
those issues.
Accordingly, the Motions of the respective plaintiffs for
Summary Judgment are denied.

The Motion for Summary Judgment

of the defendants is granted in part and denied in part in
conformance with this Memorandum Decision.
Counsel for the defendant is requested to prepare an Order
reflecting the foregoing, and submit the same, to the Court for
review and signature pursuant to Rule 2.9/tt the Rules of
Practice for the District Courts of the/State of Utah.
Dated this

^&

day of No^^beV\ 19&

JTH^/R. HANSON
JTRICT^JUDGE
i

i ,

]

>

/

0 0 0 i.'jc
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this

J-

day of November, 1983:

Lon Rodney Kump
Attorney for Plaintiff
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kent M. Winterholler
James M. Elegante
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Pearson
Enterprises, Boyer-Gardner Hotel
Properties, Tri-Arc Hotel Associates,
and Holiday Inns, Inc.
185 South State Street
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Dorothy C. Pleshe
Attorney for Plaintiff Utah
Hotel Company
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Roger F. Cutler
Attorney for Defendants
100 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

APPENDIX II
JUDGMENT ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R-924)

F!L£D IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Sait Lake Count", Utah

JAN 16 1964
ROGER F . CUTLER
S a l t Lake C i t y A t t o r n e y
Attorney for Defendants
100 C i t y & County B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Telephone:
535-7788

., „D.,
„ « . -inaicy.QiOSrd Cist. Court
H

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
)

JUDGMENT ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

Civil No. C 82-5220

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)

The plaintiffs Pearson Enterprises Partnership Company,
Boyer-Gardner Hotel Properties Partnership, Tri-Arc Hotel
Associates, and Holiday Inns, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and the defendants1 cross Motion for Summary Judgment
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Judge Timothy
R. Hanson on the 25th day of March, 1983. The Court on said date
further considered the defendants1 objections and motion to
strike plaintiff's affidavits.

The court havinq reviewed the

memorandum of counsel, having conducted its own independent
research, having heard the arguments of counsel, havinq entered

i\i\:\*\™*

its Memorandum Decision, and being fully advised in the premises
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:

1.

The aforesaid plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment should be and the same is denied, with prejudice.
2.

The defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted

in part. All of the plaintiffs1 claims are dismissed with
prejudice, excepting only the issue of the legality of tax
classification of the City ordinance subject of the within
dispute and whether or not such classification is arbitrary
and/or discriminatory as applied.
3.

The defendants' objection to the Affidavit submitted by
/

the plaintiffs is denied.
DATED this

jp

day of \M^C/^hCCf /

, 198#?

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
By

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Judgment on Motions for Summary Judgment, by depositing the same
in the U.S. mail, postaqe prepaid, this ^r"1^ day of VJ^A* C ^4\c<X-y
1983 to the following:

Lon Rodney Kump
Attorney for Plaintiff
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kent M. Winterholler
James M. Elegante
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Pearson Enterprises
185 South State Street
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Dorothy C. Pleshe
Attorney for Plaintiff Utah Hotel Company
Kennecott Building, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

IW

cc80

^ ^y.

Approved as to form.

r7^^<£^C^ i^Lyb

X&& //A*

\^^\y^Q^lioh
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APPENDIX III
MEMORANDUM DECISION OF FEBRUARY 14, 1986 (R-1135)

ba -ake County Utah"

FEB 141986
H. Dixo^Hindiey, Clerk 3rd Dist. Court
T

0

^Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

C-82-5220

Plaintiff,
vs<
SALT LAKE CITY, et al.,
Defendants.

The matter pending before the Court in the above-referenced
proceeding is the defendant Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion
for a Protective Order, wherein the City seeks to relieve a
third party, Utah Power and Light, from the obligation to respond
to a Subpoena Duces Tecum, dated July 11, 1985, issued and served
at the request of the plaintiff.

The matter of the type of

discovery sought by the proposed inquiry directed at Utah Power
and Light has been before the Court on at least two prior occasions.
On those prior occasions the Court has refused to allow the
inquiry, and has granted the protective relief sought, or on
the last occasion, has refused to reconsider a prior Order.
At the latest hearing, all interested parties appeared and argued
their respective positions.

It was clear to the Court that

the Court's prior rulings regarding the defendant City's Motions
for Summary Judgment are not clear as to what issues remain
for determination in this suit.

Accordingly, the Court directed

LITTLE AMERICA V. CITY
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

counsel to set forth their positions as to the breadth of the
Court's prior rulings on the City's Motions for Summary Judgment
regarding the remaining issues, in letter form.

The parties

have done that, and the Court has reviewed those materials.
The Court was hopeful that the capsulized versions in the aforementioned letter briefs would allow the Court to re-evaluate
the issues and resolve the questions regarding the remaining
issues for trial determination without the necessity of reviewing
all the prior Memoranda in the prior extensive files that led
up to this Court's Order dealing with the plaintiff's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment which were denied, and the defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment which was granted in part and denied
in part.

Unfortunately, such was not the case, and to adequately

advise itself regarding the reasons and basis, and more particularly
the scope and breadth of the Court's rulings regarding remaining
issues the Court has again reviewed the materials submitted
in this case by all parties.

Having accomplished that task,

and having taken into account the arguments of the parties,
the Court makes the following Memorandum Decision.
As to the position of the parties as to the scope and breadth
of the Court's ruling on the defendant City's Motions for Summary
Judgment, the position asserted by Salt Lake City is correct.
Whether or not the benefits received by the plaintiff from the
defendant bears any relationship to the taxes paid is not an

* s '*£
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

issue that remains for determination.

The Court's prior rulings

LITTLE AMERICA V. CITY

on the defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment encompassed such
a claim, and by this Memorandum any ambiguity contained in either
the Memorandum Decision or the subsequent Order signed by the
Court is resolved.

The only remaining issue is whether or not

the tax classification in question is arbitrary and/or discriminatory
as applied.
Based upon the foregoing clarification of the Court's prior
Orders, the information sought from non-party Utah Power and
Light to which the defendant City objects and seeks a protective
order is not material nor relevant to the remaining issues,
and therefore the protective order sought by the City should
be granted.
Counsel for the City is requested to pdrepare an appropriate
Order which encompasses not only this/Court's ruling on the
requested protective order, but specifically identifies in accordance
with the foregoing discussions the issue remaining for determination.
Dated this

y=

dav of
F e b r u a r y 1/8 6.
_day
of February

?IMOTHYNR. HANSON
/DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
H. OJXO HtNCtSY
3y'

tCC^^-c

'240vt. Zuv*.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following, this_

.day of February, 198 6:

Lon Rodney Kump
David J. Bird
Attorneys for Plaintiff
333 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Roger F. Cutler
Salt Lake City Attorney
Attorney for Defendants
100 City & County Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John Fellows
800 Kennecott Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

84133

Kent M. Winterholler
185 S. State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Paul H. Proctor
Attorneys for Utah Power and Light
1407 W. North Temple, Suite 340
P. O. Box 899
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

coigns

APPENDIX IV
ORDER CLARIFYING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND GRANTING PROTECTIVE ORDER (R-1141)

' i jbniVS i ^ L * /

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

MAY 2 8 1986
H. OixonHindley. Cler*r3cd Dist. Court

ROGER F . CUTLER, USB No- 791
S a l t Lake C i t y A t t o r n e y
Attorney for Defendants
100 C i t y & County B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1
Telephone:
535-7788

By

/
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION, a U t a h
corporation,

:

Plaintiff,

ORDER CLARIFYING
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND GRANTING PROTECTIVE
ORDER

:

C i v i l No. C-82-522 0
(Timothy R. Hanson)

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, e t a l . ,

:

Defendants.

Salt
1985,

:

Lake C i t y ' s Motion f o r a P r o t e c t i v e Order of J u l y 3 0 ,

c o n c e r n i n g a Subpoena Duces Tecum s e r v e d on Utah Power and

L i g h t came on r e g u l a r l y f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b l e

Timothy

R. Hanson on A u g u s t 12, 1 9 8 5 .

motion

The i s s u e s r e g a r d i n g s a i d

t u r n e d on t h e i s s u e s r e m a i n i n g f o r t r i a l

following the Court's

g r a n t i n g of t h e C i t y ' s Motion f o r P a r t i a l Summary Judgment on
December 2 0 , 1 9 8 3 ; t h e r e f o r e ,
and s u b m i t t a l s

t h e C o u r t r e v i e w e d t h e memorandums

of t h e p a r t i e s ,

reviewed t h e matters heretofore
of

h e a r d o r a l a r g u m e n t and a g a i n
p r e s e n t e d t o t h e Court i n s u p p o r t

t h e o r i g i n a l m o t i o n s f o r summary j u d g m e n t .
^ *

r

The Court having reviewed all such matters and being fully
advised in the premises and having entered a Memorandum Decision
regarding said matter on February 13, 1986,
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The City

!

s Motion for a Protective Order concerning a

certain subpoena duces tecum dated on or about July 11, 198 5,
directed against Utah Power & Light, should be and the same is
hereby granted.

Said subpoena is quashed and Utah Power & Light

is relieved of any obligation to respond thereto.
2.

The Partial Summary Judgment heretofore entered by the

Court is hereby clarified to aid the parties in conducting
further discovery and trial preparation.

The scope and intent of

the previous Partial Summary Judgment was to dismiss all claims,
assertions and legal theories advanced by the plaintiff, as a
matter of law, excepting only the issue of whether the tax
classification selected by Salt Lake City Corporation was
arbitrary and/or discriminatory as applied.

The matter left for

trial or further proceeding in the within case does not include a
comparison of the public service benefits received by the plaintiff (s), or other innkeepers subject to the ordinance challenged
by plaintiffs in the within litigation, from the City in relation
to taxes paid by them.

Thus, any further discovery from Utah

Power & Light Company or other utility companies regarding the
amount of tax paid by said utility companies to the City, attributable to the payments made by the plaintiff, is irrelevant,
-2-

immaterial and not subject to further discovery.
whether or not benefits received by p l a i n t i f f

Further,

from Salt Lake City

bear any relationship to the amount of taxes paid by plaintiff

is

not an issue remaining for determination in £ftis case.
DATED t h i s

£ Y

day of RprJrLfflSZS.
BY THE/COURT:

'IMtfTHY^R. HANSON
'DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ATTEST
H. D1XQN HINDLEY

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

< g ^ A ~ ) /JL^^S^
/
By
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
Deoun Oier
the foregoing Order Clarifying P a r t i a l Summary Judgment and
Granting Protective Order to the below-listed p a r t i e s by
depositing same in the U.S. mail with postage prepaid thereon
this

^'^ < (3ay of April,

198 6:

Lon Rodney Kump
David J. Bird
Attorneys for Plaintiff
333 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John Fellows
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Kent M. Winterholler
185 S. State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

-3-

m

*~

P a u l H. P r o c t o r
A t t o r n e y f o r Utah Power & L i g h t
1407 W. North Temple, S u i t e 340
P . O . Box 899
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111

" " ~?
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APPENDIX V
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION'S ANSWERS TO
DEFENDANT'S THIRD SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (R-1207)

CAT;

/^

David J. Bird (#0224
i» RICHARDS/ BIRD Or .\L. .."
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
333 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Teiechcne: (301) 328-3937
V
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m

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION/ a Utah corporation,

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION'S ANSWERS
TO DEFENDANT'S THIRD
SET OF INTERROGATORIES
AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of
Utah r

Civil No. C-82-5220

Defendant.

Judge Timothy R. Hansen

Little America Hotel Corporation answers Defendant's
Third Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents
as follows:
Interrocatory No. 1:

Please state in full detail ailj

information tending to support or deny that the Ordinances establish j
a tax classification that is "arbitrary, lacking a rational basis, •;
and/or discriminatory as aoDlied."

i
!

ANSWER NO. 1: Plaintiff LAHCO objects to this interrogatory !
because the portion of the interrogatory in quotation marks does i
Hnet property
stated

reflect the issue remaining

for determination as:

in the Court's Memorandum Decision of February 13, 1986;

or in its Order Clarifying Partial Summary Judgment and GrantingProtective Order dated May 28, 1986, which states that the issue1

'J
>

remaining for determination

is "whether the tax classification.

If

y

was arbitrary and/or discriminatory

as applied."

Because of
j

this objection, Interrogatory No. 1 will be treated as seeking;
information en the issue as stated in the CourtTs Order,
The Court's Order dated May 28, 19 8 6 states that:
the matter left for trial . . .does not include
a comparison of the public service benefits
received by the plaintiff (s ) , or other innkeepers
subject to the ordinance challenged by plaintiffs
in the within litigation, from the city in
relation to taxes paid by them.
LAECO and its counsel are uncertain of the breadth
of the Court's ruling.

LAECO has no p y ^ ^ ^ a ^v„- -*-n »»»n; nn-r-o

has b^^r arbitrarily applied or discriminatorily applied, with
the understanding that those terms mean that the ordinance was
applied to LAECO and not other members of the class subject to)
the tax imposed by the ordinance. But the Order of May 28, 1986
—
—
—
j
can be read to reserve the issue of whether the ordinance itself!
I
is arbitrary. For that reason, and on the issue of whether the.
!

ordinance is arbitrary, olaintiff

intends at trial to proffer;

I

evidence through its expert, Merrill Norman, whose a:::dav:tsi

!i have previously been submitted, as to the tax burden imposed!

'!'
j! upon Little America

I
Hotel and its customers in comparison with:

i.

\ those imDCsed en averace residents of Salt Lake Citv or the owners'
!

of other commercial property in the downtown area.

Little America!
J *>!
*

3

1

il Hotel C o r p o r a t i o n w i l l a l s o p r o f f e r

I

evidence, from Mr. Kenneth;

*

ii

— —

I

i

I Y. Knight, and Mike Fletcher regarding the lack of any demand:
II for city services bv hotels and betels different, frcn these cf:
| ether

residents and/cr commercial properties.

Also, records!

jl cf the Salt Lake City Police Department and Fire Department are;
I prepared yearly on police calls and fire calls in various four:
I block square sections cf Salt Lake City.

These will be used

as evidence that hotels and motels do not create special demands
en the fire department or police department. Some cf this information
is contained in the unification

studv dated Octoberr

1978 and

jl prepared by the Salt Lake City Police Department and Salt Lake
County Sheriffs1 Offices.
Other

information relevant to the determination

of

the arbitrariness of the ordinance include the minutes and transcripts
of the Salt Lake City Council Meetings, which were Exhibits "3"
land

"C" to the Second Affidavit of Kathryn Marshall and were

Exhibits

rt

2-A" through

"2-D" of Salt Lake City Corporation's

I Answers to Plaintiff LAHCO's First Set of Interrogatories (hereinafter |
jj "City's Answers").

Also the documents considered by or referred

ito by the City Council during its consideration of the ordinance, j
I including the letter from Michael Fletcher, City's Answers Exhibit!
||"2~G", the Hotel Motel Fact Sheet, Citv's Answers Exhibit "2-H",i
i!
Ijthe o r i g i n a l d r a f t of the o r d i n a n c e , C i t y ' s A n s w e r s Exhibit

"2-1",

the Impact Statement, City's Answers Exhibit "2-J", The Innkeeper

License

Tax a s

an

Alternative

Revenue

Source,

City's

Answer:
i

Exhibit

!

"4-G",

Mike F l e t c h e r s

Report,

Exhibit

" 4 - H " , Al

Haines

Report of Objections, City f s Answers Exhibit "4-1", the report
of the Blue Ribbon Committee, City r s

i

Answers

Exhibit

"4-J".

Also, records of budget expenditures, City's Answers Exhibits
"10-A", "ii-A", "11-3", "il-C", "ll-D n , and "11-E", records of
the department budgets for the police, fire, park and recreation,}
and public works departments, City's Answers Exhibits
through

"13-A"!

"33-A", Public Works Departmentfs records of man hours!

spend by sub-categories, City's Answers Exhibit "37-A".

This

information will show thar. the classification of innkeepers asi
subject to the special tax was net justified by any factual basis
or distinction in any wav related to the ouriDoses of the ordinance*
The information will show that singling out innkeepers for the;
tax was arbitrary and was created only for the purposes of balancingj
the budget, avoiding raising property tax levels, and to make
uo for a short-fail resulting from the invalidity of the Citvfsi

;

..

francmse

.
taxes

against

.,. .

.

utilities,

ana n o t

.. .1
ror

any r e a s o n

wmcn»
I
would justify separate taxation of innkeeoers as a revenue source.
i

i

P l a i n t i f f i s aware, through d e f e n d a n t ' s previous submittal!
of

affidavits,

and f i r e
compared

of

the

contention

of

Salt

Lake C i t y t h a t

i

police;

departments are disproportionately
to

other

businesses

or

i m p a c t e d by i n n k e e p e r s .
i
r e s i d e n t s similarly situated.1
i

If

such

testimony

is

introduced

at

trial,

LAECO w i l l

introduce

I
I

I

»

5

:

evidence to dispute those claims, including previously identified
records of yearly calls, the National Standards for ?_ire 'Pr^^^^^icn
and

^n rn

"* - —— ^"~* ^ *- : ^ ^

njr H ° ^

ac

-' c

^ oo^o^

r:

,3r,r.rj^r.i^r^—*>©-—distUte

the. ciaims_r:f->-£aJJi-^^-ia--^i-c-y-L5-~witnesses .
Plaintiff
.

.

.

.

has nor yet deposed the members of the
.

.

.

,

,

City
. i

Council a t t.ie tinie m e orca.nan.es was cassea, out reserves trie1
I
right to call those members as witnesses to supply further information!
regarding the consideration of the ordinance by the Salt Lake!
City Council*
Interrocatory No, 2:

Identify the origin or sourcej

of the information offered in response to Interrogatory No. 1
above.

For each source or person identified, please describe!

their relationship to the parties in this case and their full
name, address, and telephone number as specified previously in!
Section I, "Preliminary Statement" above. Please include a detailed!
description of the qualifications and background any such source*,
or person.
ANS AH£R NO. 2 : Refer to Answer to Interrogatory No. 1. j
Interrocatory No. 3: Please state the name, address,

I
and telephone number of each and everv witness tlaintiff still!

I
I
1

intends to call to testify in any further proceedings regarding:
resolution of the remaining
in that answer:

issue in this litigation.

Include

i

I

I
t

t

:

6

(a)

A summary of

the

testimony

expec-ed t c

be
!
I

elicitedr a n d ;
(b)

j

An identification of each and every exhibit:

which will be utilized

by said witness, including a

brief summarv of the exhibit and its contents.

j

I
(c)

A detailed description or the qualifications;

and educational background of any proposed expert witness*!
(d)

The factual basis

for any expert opinion!

expected to be introduced.
ANSWER NO. 3:
I*
Kenneth Y. Knight
550 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
363-5100
(a) Testimony regarding the taxes paid or collected!
by Little America Hotel Corporation, the services provided!
by Little America Eotel Corporation which are provided!
by Salt Lake City free of charge to others.

Payments!

i
actually made bv Little America Eotel Corooration Dursuant,

I

to the tax established by the ordinance.
\
(b)
Exhibits: No exhibits have been identified
i

i

or prepared

for introduction

through Mr. Knight, but

mav include accounting records relating to the suspects

I
j

of his testimony.

|

(c)

Not applicable.

,

(d)

Net aoolicable.

I

II.

Merrill Norman
KMG Main-Eurdxrtan
4th Floor Kennecott Building

!
J
|

Salt Lake City, Utah

!

(a)

84133

See Affidavits of Merrill Norman previously

submitted

and description of testimony in Answer to

Interrogatory No. 1, above.

i

(b) See Exhibits to Affidavits previously submitted.!
Otherwise, plaintiff has not yet determined what exhibits
will be entered through

he use of Mr. Norman.

(c)

See Affidavit of Merrill Norman.

(d)

See Affidavit of Merrill Norman.

Plaintiff LAECO has not yet determined whether to call
as witnesses surviving members of the City Council at the time!
the ordinance was passed—Sydney

Fonnesbeck, Palmer DePaulis,

Alice Shearer, Ron Whitehead, and Grant Maybey, or Al Eaines,
former administrator with Salt Lake City.

They would testify

as to their knowledge of the matters considered by and deliberations
of the City Council.
Plaintiff may also call representatives of the Salt
Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau with regard to the
information

in the possession of that body about tourists, the

amount of money they spend in Salt Lake City, the length of their
| stay, their impact on public revenues, and their use of public
benefits.

s
I

I

Plaintiff may call Jack Ciscn of the Utah Tax Payers
Association, 1309 Wilson Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utahf

regarding

the basis and reasons for his comments to the City Council with
regard to this ordinance.

Other witnesses may include a recrei

seriwarive of the Utah S t a t e University I n s t i t u t e of Outdoor Recreation
and Tourism r e g a r d i n g s t u d i e s oerformed by t h a t i n s t i t u t e and
I
their results*

While plaintiff LAHCO has net finalized its triall

preparations, these are the witnesses currently anticipated to|
appear or who may appear as plaintiffTs witnesses during it case
in chief.
Interrocatory No. 4:

Please state the name, address,

telephone number, and position with the plaintiff of the person!
answering these Interrogatories.
ANSWER NO. 4:

Because the Interrogatories asked byj

defendant Salt Lake City seek information uniquely in the possession
of its counsel, these Interrogatories have been prepared by David
J. Bird of Richards, Bird

& Kumo, 333 East Fourth South, Salt:

I
Lake City, Utah 84111, 328-8987, who has signed them in his capacity
as attorney for plaintiff.

DATED this

/7' day of

V C T^b^T

, 1986

r
RICHARDS,
& KUMP
2r~s/y- BIRD
^?s67>/
Davie J. Bira
Attornevs
rneys for Little America
Eotel Corporation

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

On rhe

\r%^

/ r*

C\ * >

Ufl^J^_>

day cf

, 1985, p e r s o n a l l y

appeared before me DAVID J . 3I3.D, who by me being f i r s t

dulv:

sworn t n a t he i s t h e person who signed tne foregoing document:
and t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s contained t h e r e i n are t r u e t o the best;
of h i s knowledge.

My Commission Expires:

irs M9^
i*<*n
/SI*.:,
IfiJif ZD

(

JtfJlJ.uTflj
N0TA

/? WttyfajL&}
u

- '. J
^ ? ^ 7 ? County, Utah!
Residing
a t Saltdl/ake

"77
CERTIFICATE OF, SERVICE
This certifies that on the

)r&

^
day of

Uzid/Jth)

,

1986, I served the foregoing LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL CORPORATION'S
ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT'S THIRD SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS by mailing true and correct copies
hereof,- postage prepaid, addressed to:

j

Roger F. Cutler, Esq.
Salt Lake City Attorney
100 City & County Building
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111

• t

JO
.*<^

- < * . +?

ROGER F . CUTLER # 7 9 1
S a l t Lake C i t y A t t o r n e y
Attorney for Defendant
324 S o u t h S t a t e , 5 t h F l o o r
S a l t Lake C i t v , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1
Telephone:
(301) 535-7733
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION, a U t a h
corporation, et al. ,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

)

SALT LAKE C I T Y , a
municipal corporation
o f t h e S t a t e of U t a h ,

)
)
)

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF ROGER F .

C i v i l No. C - 8 2 - 5 2 2 0
J u d g e T i m o t h y R. H a n s o n

)

)
:

County of S a l t

ss.

Lake)

ROGER F. CUTLER, A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t S a l t Lake
Corporation,

CUTLER

h a v i n g been f i r s t

City

d u l y sworn upon o a t h , d e p o s e s and

says :
1.

The a t t a c h e d

a s an o b j e c t i o n
of

to P l a i n t i f f ' s

Interrogatories,

respond

l e t t e r d a t e d O c t o b e r 2 1 , 1936 was w r i t t e n

asking

to I n t e r r o g a t o r y

Answers t o D e f e n d a n t ' s

t h a t LAHCO amend

No. 1 , i f

Third

i t s a n s w e r to

any i n f o r m a t i o n

was in

Set
fully
their

possession
2.

The a t t a c h e d

received
October

with reference

letter,

from P l a i n t i f f
21,

to the question
dated

a s asked.

October

LAKCO i n r e s p o n s e

3 0 , 1 9 8 6 , was

to Affiant's

l e t t e r of

1986.

DATED t h i s

<•

day o f March, 1 9 8 7 .
~->

'^ROGER/F.

CUTLER,

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b ^ ^ T S e ? ^ i s
— ^ ^ * * .

198 7.

§fgr

Affiant

lc^-

day o f March,

~~^

\£%

\^jqi^r%PC8LICr residing in
'^sSJZpLg&t' County, Utah
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby c e r t i f y
Affidavit

t h a t I mailed a copy of the foregoing

of Roger F. Cutler

KUMP, Attorney f o r P l a i n t i f f ,

to David J . Bird,

333 East 4th South, S a l t Lake C i t y ,

Utah 84111; John Fellows and Dorothy C. Pleshe,
Building,

185 South S t a t e S t r e e t ,

Utah 84111 by d e p o s i t i n g

ccl36

800 Kennecott

S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84133; and to Kent M.

Winterholler,

prepaid,

RICHARDS, BIRD &

this

S u i t e 700, Salt Lake C i t y ,

the same in the U.S. m a i l ,

day of March, 198 7.

postage

OTE®

ROGER F. CUTLER
CITY ATTORNEY

CHERYL D. LUKE

(SLUT QiMQMLQf

LAW DEPARTMENT
ICO CITY A N D C O U N T Y B U I L D I N G
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111
(801) 525-7788

CITY PROSECUTOR

October 21, 1986

ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS

RAY L. MONTGOMERY
GREG R. HAWKINS
JUDY F. LEVER
LARRY V. SPENDLOVE
STEVEN W. ALLRED
BRUCE R. 3AIRD
FRANK M. NAKAMURA
ASSISTANT PROSECUTORS

JOHN N. SPIKES

DONALD L. GEORGE
ARTHUR L KEESLER. JR.
CECELIA M. ESPENCZA

David J .
RICHARDS,
333 E a s t
S a l t Lake

Bird, Esq.
BIRD & KUMP
Fourth South
C i t y , Utah
84111
Re J

Dear

Little

America v .

SLC

Dave:

I am i n r e c e i p t o f y o u r a n s w e r s t o o u r t h i r d s e t o f
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , b u t o b j e c t t o y o u r r e p h r a s i n g my q u e s t i o n
o n t h e p r e m i s e t h a t my i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s m u s t b e l i m i t e d by
t h e l a n g u a g e of a C o u r t O r d e r o r b y y o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f
t h a t Order.
I h e r e b y r e q u e s t t h a t you amend y o u r a n s w e r t o f u l l y
r e s p o n d t o I n t e r r o g a t o r y No. 1 , i f a n y a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n i s in your p o s s e s s i o n w i t h r e f e r e n c e to the q u e s t i o n a s
a s ked .
In a d d i t i o n , I o b j e c t t o t h e v a g u e a n s w e r on p a g e 5
s u g g e s t i n a t h a t you w i l l p r o d u c e s u c h o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n a s
deemed a p p r o p r i a t e to d i s p u t e .
If you h a v e a n y s u c h i n f o r a t i o n , we r e q u i r e t h a t i t b e d i s c l o s e d .
If t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n
i s n o t now i n y o u r p o s s e s s i o n , we w i l l e x p e c t t h a t , p u r s u a n t
t o t h e r u l e s of p r o c e d u r e , you w i l l make i t a v a i l a b l e a s an
amendment to t h e s e a n s w e r s a s soon a s i t i s a v a i l a b l e .
In
a n y e v e n t , a t t h i s d a t e , we n e e d an a f f i r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t a s
t o w h e t h e r any a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n i s i n y o u r p o s s e s s i o n
u p o n w h i c h you i n t e n d t o r e l y .
T h i s l e t t e r i s w r i t t e n in l i e u of making formal o b j e c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o t h e new r u l e s w h i c h r e q u i r e ccmmun i c a t i o n
between counsel.
I w o u l d a o o r e c i a t e an a m e n d m e n t t o v o u r

.**.

David J . B i r d , Esq.
O c t o b e r 2 1 , 1986
Page - 2 -

a n s w e r s w i t h i n t e n d a y s t o avoid t h e n e c e s s i t y of fur t h e i
c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s in t h i s m a t t e r .
Sincerely,/

(JROGER^T CUTLER
^City Attorney
RFC:cml4 8

•V-

LAW OFFICES OF

R.ICHARDS. BiHD 8 K.UMP
LYNN 5. RICHARDS
RICHARD L 3IRD.JR.
LON RCDNEY KiiM?
JAMES M. RICHARDS
STEVEN C. JOHNSON
DAVID J BIRD
LISA K. CLSEN

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
TELEPHONE 328*8987
AREA CODE aoi

333 EAST FOURTH SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH

aam

October 30, 1986

A £C =| v E D
CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

^•Mul £k

DAT
Roger F. Cutler, Esq.
Salt Lake City Attorney
100 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re:

Little America Hotel Corporation vs. Salt
Lake City

Dear Roger:
This letter is in response to yours of October
21, 19 8 6 relating to the Answers to Interrogatories sent
to you by mail on October 17, 1986.
First, you dispute my objection to your first
interrogatory, which adds the phrase "lacking in a rational
basis" as one of the issues to be determined. I believe
that the Court did limit the issues to those to which
I have responded by the Answers to Interrogatories*
AC££rdijig.1 y-T—T hplieyp that ^hp nhjpr-M'nn stated in the
answers is we1T-^?,kQn.
However, the only evidence we
'have which would relate to the issue of whether the tax
classification is lacking a rational basis is that stated
in the Answers to Interrogatories, plus the tax information
the Court has previously ruled was beyond the scope of
discovery and was not admissible as evidence in the case.
Second, you object to the portion of my answer
at the top of page 5 of the Answers to Interrogatories*
The purpose of this statement is merely to say that we
intend to produce evidence to rebut testimony which you
might produce during the trial.
I have in my answers
already anticipated the evidence you might put on in
support of your position as best as I am able, and identified
what evidence we would use to dispute that. But I am
unable to say what testimony you might produce and what
would be appropriate to rebut that testimony. Accordingly,
I think it is impossible to give a more specific response.
If you identify what specific evidence you will produce,
I will identify how that will be rebutted, if at all.
But I can f t be held to be limited in my rebuttal by what
I might now anticipate you producing at trail. Accordingly,
I find it impossible to address your second objection
to my answers.

^C

I hope that this clarifies my intentions
my Answers to Interrogatories.
. Very truly yours,
RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP
/?

David J. Bird
DJB:lgh
cc: Little America Hotel Corporation

! v

ROGER F . CUTLER #7 91
S a l t Lake C i t y A t t o r n e y
Attorney for Defendant
324 South S t a t e , 5 t h F l o o r
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1
Telephone:
(801) 535-7788
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPO RATION, a U t a h
corporation, et al. ,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN KATTER
C i v i l No. C - 8 2 - 5 2 2 0
J u d g e T i m o t h y R. H a n s o n

)

vs .
SALT LAKE CITY, a
m u n i c i p a l corpo r a t i o n
of t h e S t a t e of U t a h ,

)
)
)

Defendant,

STATE OF UTAH
C o u n t y of

Salt

)

)
:
Lake)

ss.

JOHN KATTER, h a v i n g
and

been f i r s t

d u l y sworn upon o a t h ,

deposes

says:
1.

Business
2.

He i s a d u l y a p p o i n t e d
License
All

supervisor

of

the

Salt

Lake

City

Department.

innkeepers

within

the

scope of

Business

Revenue Tax O r d i n a n c e

are

equally

schedule

set

forth

in

that ordinance.

Salt
taxed

Lake

City!s

according

Each i s r e q u i r e d

to

to
pay

the

upon p e n a l t y of r e v o c a t i o n of t h e i r b u s i n e s s l i c e n s e ,
legislatively established
within

the taxing

n o t t i m e l y pay a r e
pursued
3.

tax.

classification
identified

to t h e e x t e n t l e g a l l y
To a f f i a n t ' s

best

included

a r e paying

best

knowledge

the t a x .

vigorously

permitted.
diligent

t h e meaning of t h e

i n t h e tax l a w ' s a p p l i c a t i o n ,

inquiry,

no

ordinance

of t h e above c a p t i o n e d l a w s u i t h a s n o t been

DATED t h i s

all

Any who do

and c o l l e c t i o n m e a s u r e s

knowledge, a f t e r

t r a n s i e n t room p r o v i d e r w i t h i n
subject

To a f f i a n t ' s

the

identified,

and payment made.

day of March, 198 7.

J^^/f^7^Z~

JOHN ^ T T E R V

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me t h i s

Affiant

J-L_

V^— day of

1987.

NOTARY PUBLIC, r e s i d i n g
S a l t Lake County, Utah
My Commission

Expires
r U,-

in

March,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby c e r t i f y
Affidavit
Attorney

that

of John K a t t e r
for P l a i n t i f f ,

I m a i l e d a copy of t h e

to David J .
333 E a s t

Bird,

4th S o u t h ,

8 4 1 1 1 ; J o h n F e l l o w s and Dorothy C. P l e s h e ,
Building,

S a l t Lake C i t y ,

Winter-holler,

prepaid,

ccl36

this

day of

RICHARDS, BIRD & KUMP,
Salt

Lake C i t y ,

Utah

800 K e n n e c o t t

Utah 8 4 1 3 3 ; and to Kent M.

185 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t ,

Utah 8 4 1 1 1 , by d e p o s i t i n g

foregoing

S u i t e 7 0 0 , S a l t Lake

t h e same in t h e U . S . m a i l ,

City,

postage

, 1987.

APPENDIX
MINUTE ENTRY (R-1291)

Mmute Book Form 103

1

0 1 1

County of Salt Lake - State of UtarCU *£ ! r m
LITTLE AMERICA CORPORATION. ET AL
Plaintiff

o A b & N0:

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
Defendant

Type of hearing: Div
Present: Pltf

Annul
Deft.

\

P.Atty:
DAVTT) J . BTRD
Cfi J
D. Atty:
ROGER F . CUTLER ( pj
Sworn & Examined: -~^L<^^^
^ei^-CO^J
PltfDeftOthers:

Supp. Order
Summons

OSC.

SJ

OtherStipulation

Waiver
Publication
r j Default of Pltf/Deft Entered
Date: MAY 1 8 , 1987
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON
clerk: E . THOMPSON
Reporter: ~~/ry^>t^yu^
~?yU^<-*^e^zs*^ss^
Bailiff- J . XlRSMAN /
(
Bailiff:

ORDERS:
•
•

Custody Evaluation Ordered
Visitation Rights

n
•
n

=
Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $
x
__ Per Month/Year
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:.

•

D

Custody Awarded To

•

Per Month
Alimony Waived

n

Atty. fees to the
Home To:

D
•
•
•
•
•
•
1]
•
•

Furnishings To:
Automobile To:
Each Party Awarded their Personal Property
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children
Restraining Order Entered Against.
Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $
90-Day Waiting Period is Waived
Divorce Granted To
As
Decree To Become Final: • Upon Entry
• 3-Month Interlocutory
Former Name of

•

Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, <
orders
/
shall issue for Deft.
Returnable
Bail

•

Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing thei
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

_ in the amount of _

Based on wntt'tfn stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff o oouncolr court orders

•

Deferred

Is Rest

/TZ/J^

-PrGi

APPENDIX VII
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R-1296)

- ^ *,

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

JUL - 7 1987
H Di:

»nd,ey, Clerk

iStyQourt

By C ^ < ! ^ < ^

ROGER F . CUTLER #0 7 91
S a l t Lake C i t y A t t o r n e y
Attorney for Defendants
100 C i t y & C o u n t y B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1
Telephone:
535-7788

C'srK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT IAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION, a U t a h
corporation, et al. ,

)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs.

)

SALT LAKE C I T Y , e t

al. ,

)

Defendants.

)

The C o u r t e n t e r e d
December 20,
Partial
on o r

1983 and

a Partial
clarified

about

May 2 8 ,

1986.
Salt

that order

hearing

defendants

before

the

Additional

Lake C i t y ,

Judgment on the remaining

issues,

Little

attorneys

discovery

moved

for

was

total

Hotel

Lon R o d n e y Kump and

May 1 8 ,

attorney,

David J .

Clarifying

Summary

Roger
was

Bird.

entered

undertaken

1987.

Corporation,

about

Order,

w h i c h M o t i o n came o n

by t h e i r

America

i n an O r d e r

Protective

C o u r t on Monday,

were r e p r e s e n t e d

The p l a i n t i f f ,
by i t s

Summary J u d g m e n t o n o r

Summary J u d g m e n t a n d G r a n t i n g

and t h e d e f e n d a n t ,

for

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
C i v i l N o ^ C 82-5220
J u d g e TimotliT—fe—HanrTson
C o n s o l i d a t i n g Case Nos. :
C 8 2 - 5 2 2 0 , J u d g e Hanson
C 8 2 - 5 5 8 6 , Judge Hanson
C 8 2 - 7 5 1 1 , Judge Hanson
C 83-5577, Judge F i s h i e r
C 8 4 - 2 5 4 9, J u d g e R i g t r u p
C 85-657, Judge Conder
C 85-7323, Judge F i s h i e r
C 86-5 809, Judge Hanson
C 87-2888, Judge Rokich

regularly
The

F.

Cutler.

represented
The

Hotel

•o£

Utah was r e p r e s e n t e d
parties
having

by i t s a t t o r n e y ,

Russ K e a r l .

The o t h e r

were not p r e s e n t o r r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l .
heard

t h e a r g u m e n t s of t h e c o u n s e l , h a v i n g

The C o u r t

read

the

memoranda and r e v i e w e d t h e m a t t e r s of r e c o r d and b e i n g
advised

in t h e

premises;

HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDCES AND DECREES a s
1.

fully

There i s no g e n u i n e m a t e r i a l

defendants are entitled

follows:

i s s u e of f a c t and

the

t o and a r e h e r e b y awarded a Summary J u d g -

ment of d i s m i s s a l on a l l r e m a i n i n g i s s u e s of t h e c a s e .
c a u s e s of a c t i o n and c l a i m s s h o u l d be and t h e saijre a r e
dismissed,
2.

with

hereby

prejudice.

D e f e n d a n t s a r e awarded

EftTED t h i s

All

/

costs.

day of gun*/, 1987<
BY THE/COURT!

EMtfTHY R. HANSON, J u d g e
rv
'Ui'

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING*
I hereby c e r t i f y

t h a t I mailed

a copy of t h e

Summary Judgment t o Lon Rodney Kump and David J .
BIRD & KUMP, A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f ,
Lake C i t y ,

:- 11 ...
foregoing
Bird,

RICHARDS,

333 E a s t 4th S o u t h ,

Utah 8 4 1 1 1 ; Russ K e a r l and Dorothy C. P l e s h e ,

Salt
800

K e n n e c o t t B u i l d i n g , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 3 3 ; and to Kent M.
Winterholler,

185 South S t a t e S t r e e t ,

S u i t e 700, S a l t Lake

City,

/

the same
u t a h 84111 by d e p o s i t i n g

in the U.S. m a i l , postage

^ S ^ d. a y of J u n e , 1987.
p r e p a i•A
d , <-his
t h i s rp^~^
K s j ^ .
:cl4 6

-3-

APPENDIX VIII
CHAPTER 3, TITLE 20 REVISED ORDINANCES
OF SALT LAKE CITY (R-218)

20-2-6-20-3-1

LICENSE AND BUSINESS REGULATION

Sec. 20-2-6. Contract with State Tax Commission. Heretofore, this
municipality has entered into an agreement with the State Tax Commission
to perform all functions incident to the administration or operation of the
sales and use tax ordinance of the municipality. That contract is hereby
confirmed and the mayor is hereby authorized to enter into such
supplementary agreement with the State Tax Commission as may be
necessary to the continued administration and operation of the local sales
and use tax ordinance of the municipality as re-enacted by this ordinance.
Sec. 20-2-7. Penalties. Any person violating any of the provisions of this
ordinance shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction
thereof, shall be punishable by a fine in an amount less than $300.00 or
imprisonment for a period of not more than six months, or by both such fine
and imprisonment.
Sec. 20-2-8. Severability. If any section, subsection, sentence, clause,
phrase, or portion of this ordinance, including but not limited to any
exemption is for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by the
decision of any court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect
the validity of the remaining portions of this ordinance.
BiH No> 4^ M av20,1975
Chapter 3
BUSINESS REVENUE LICENSE
Sections:
20-3-1.
Definitions.
20-3-2.
License fee levied.
20-3-3.
Unlawful to operate without license.
20-3-4.
License additional to all regulatory licenses.
20-3-5.
Delinquent date and penalty.
20-3-6.
Records to be maintained.
20-3-7.
Returns not to be public.
20-3-8.
Unlawful to file false return.
20-3-9.
Revocation of license.
20-3-10. License fees declared to be a debt.
20-3-11. Exemptions to license.
20-3-12. Fee not to constitute undue burden on interstate commerce.
20-3-12.1. Branch establishments.
20-3-12.2. Joint license.
20-3-12.3. Revenue measure.
20-3-13. Separability clause.
20-3-14. Utility revenue tax.
20-3-14.1. Revenue tax on business in competition with public
utilities.
20-3-14.2. Commercial consumers of gas or electric energy.
Sec. 20-3-1. Definition. For the purpose of this chapter the following
terms shall have the meanings herein prescribed:
Dec., 1975
Nov., 1977
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(1) Business. ' business'' means and includes all activities engaged in
within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City carried on for the business of
gain or economic profit, except that the acts of employees rendering service
to employers shall not be included in the term business unless otherwise
specifically prescribed.
(2) Engaging in Business. "Engaging in business'' includes but is not
limited to, the sale of tangible personal property at retail or wholesale, the
manufacturing of goods or property and the rendering of personal services
for others for a consideration by persons engaged in any profession, trade,
craft, business, occupation or other calling, except the rendering of personal services by an employee to his employer under any contract of personal employment.
(3) Place of Business. "Place of business*' means each separate location
maintained or operated by the licensee within Salt Lake City from which
B,LL NO 60
business activity is conducted or transacted.
- —JUNE 23 » *970
(4) Employee. "Employee" means the operator, owner or manager of
said place of business and any persons employed by such person in the
operation of said place of business in any capacity and also any salesman,
agent or independent contractor engaged in the operation of said place of
business in any capacity.
(5) Number of Employees. "Number of employees'' shall mean the
average number of employees engaged in business at the place of business
each regular working day during the preceding calendar year. In computing said number, each regular full-time employee shall be counted as one
employee, and each part-time employee shall be counted as that fraction
which is formed by using the total number of hours worked by such employee as the numerator and the total number of hours regularly worked by
a full-time employee as the denominator.
(6) Person. "Person" shall mean any individual, receiver, assignee,
trustee in bankruptcy, trust, estate, firm, co-partnership, joint venture,
club, company, joint stock company, business trust, corporation, association,
society or other group of individuals acting as a unit, whether mutual, cooperative, fraternal, non-profit or otherwise.
(7)

Gross Sales. "Gross sales" shall not include:

(a) The amount of any Federal tax, except excise taxes imposed upon
or with respect to retail or wholesale sales, whether imposed upon the retailer, wholesaler, jobber or upon the consumer and regardless of whether or
not the amount of Federal tax is stated to customers as a separate charge; and
Feb 1968
April, 1976
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(b) The amount of net Utah State Sales Tax. The term "gross sales"
includes the amount of any manufacturer's or importer's excise tax included in the price of the property sold, even though the manufacturer or
importer is also the wholesaler or retailer thereof, and whether or not the
amount of- such^tax I n s t a t e d as a separate charge.
(^\.fC-

)

Sec. 20-3-ft<^Licence fcco loviod. (a) Thorp IG horoby levied upon the
^business of every person engaged in business in Salt Lake City at a place of
business within the city, an annual license fee of $40.00 per place of business,
plW an additional fee of $4.00 for each and every employee, exceeding one,
enaaged in the operation of said business, based upon the number of
em/pioyees defined in Section 20-3-1; provided, however, that any such person
may Veceive an exemption of $25.00 annually upon submitting an affidavit
that nis gross sales of goods and/or services for the preceding calendar year
were less than $10,000 at such place of business, and, further provided, that
t)iere shall be a maximum fee of $1,500.00 for each place of business.
Bill N o . 60, J u n e 23, 1970
Bill No. 151, Dec. 10.1975

(b) There is hereby levied upon every person engaged in business in
Salt Lake City, Utah, not having a place of business in said city, and not
exempt as provided by Sec. 20-3-11 of this chapter, a license fee based upon
the percentage of gross sales and/or services made or performed within
the city in relation to the total gross sales and/or services made or performed from a place of business outside the corporate limits of Salt Lake
City from which business within Salt Lake City is transacted and by applying such percentage to the fee which would otnerwise be assessed for such
place of business were it located within the corporate limits of Salt Lake
City.
Sec. 20-3-3. Unlawful to operate without license. It shall be unlawful for
any person to engage in business within Salt Lake City without first procuring the license required by this chapter.
Februory 6 ,

1968

Sec. 20-3-4. License additional to all regulatory licenses. The license fee
imposed by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other taxes or licenses imposed by any other provisions of the ordinances of Salt Lake City.
Sec. 20-3-5. Delinquent date and penalty. All license fees imposed by this
chapter shall be due and payable on or before January 1, of any calendar
year and in the event any fee is not paid on or before such date, a penalty
shall be assessed pursuant to the provisions of 20-1-13 of this title, which
penalty shall become part of the license fee imposed by this chapter.
February,

1970

Sec. 20-3-6. Records to be maintained. It shall be the duty of every
person liable for the payment of any license fee imposed by this chapter
Feb 1968
April. 1976
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SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE
No. 35 Of l t O
(License Fees Lev»ed)
AN ORDINANCE A M E N D ING SECTION 20-3-2 OF T H E
R E V I S E D ORDINANCES OF
SALT LAKE CITY, U T A H ,
1965, R E L A T I N G TO L I CENSE FEES L E V I E D
Be rt ortlatfted by the City
Council of Salt Lake City, Utah:
SECTION 1 That Section 203-2 of the Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City, Utah, be,
and the same hereby is
amended to read as follows.
Sec
20-3-2
License fees
levied (1) Fee for business
located in Salt Lake City
There is hereby levied upon
the business of every person
engaged in business in Salt
Lake City at a place of business within the city, an annual license fee of S50 CM per
place of business, plus an
additional fee of $5 00 for each
and every employee, exceeding one, engaged in the operation of said business, based
upon the number of employees defined in Section 20-3-1.
(2) Exceptions, maximum
fee and new businesss The
foregoing
notwithstanding,
any such person taxed in
subsection 1 above:
(a) may receive an exemption
of $25 00, annually, upon
submitting an affidavit that
the gross sales of goods
and/or services for the
preceding calendar year
were less than $20,000 at
such place of buiness,
(b) shall pay a license fee of
$25 00 for the first year, or
part thereof, of operation of
a new business
(3) Fee for businesses located outside Salt Lake City.
There is hereby levied upon
every person engaged in business in Salt Lake City, Utah,
not having a place of business
in said city, and not exempt
as provided by Sec. 20-3-11 of
this chapter, a license fee
based upon the percentage of
gross sales and J or services
made or performed from a
place of business outside the
corporate limits of Salt Lake
City from which business
within Salt Lake City is transacted and by applying such
percentage to the fee which
would otherwise be assessed
for such place of business
were «t located within the
corporate Iimtts of Salt Lake
City
SECTION 2. This ordinance
shall take effect upon its first
publication.
Passed by the City Council
of Salt Lake City, Utah, this
8th day of June, 1982.
S. Fonnesbeck
CHAIRMAN
ATTEST
Kathryn Marshall
C I T Y RECORDER
Transmitted to Mayor on
June 15, 1982.
Mayor's Action: June 15,
1982
Ted Wilson
MAYOR
ATTEST
Kathryn Marshall
CITY RECORDER
(SEAL)
B I L L 35 of 1982
Published, Deseret News
6/28/82
D-23
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to keep and preserve for a period of three years such books and records as will
accurately reflect the amount of his gross annual sales of goods and services
for any year for which an exemption is claimed, and the number of employees
and from which can be determined the amount of any license fee for which he
may be liable under the provisions of this chapter.
Sec. 20-3-7. Returns not to be public. Returns made to the license
assessor or collector of Salt Lake City, as required by this chapter, shall not
be made public nor shall they be subject to the inspection of any person except
the city license assessor and collector or his authorized agent, or to those
persons first authorized to do so by order of the board of commissioners. It
shall be unlawful for any person to make public or to inform any other person
as to the contents of any information contained in, or permit the inspection of
any return, except as is in this section authorized.
Sec. 20-3-8. Unlawful to file false return. It shall be unlawful for any
person to make a return that is false knowing the same to be so.
Sec. 20-3-9. Revocation of License. A license issued under the provisions
of this Chapter may be revoked by the Board of City Commissioners after
hearing of said Board, upon the Board's finding a violation of any provision or
failure to comply fully with the provisions of this Chapter or any other City
Ordinance.
BILL NO 5. J«. u. u*
Sec. 20-3-10. License fees declared to be a debt. Any license fee due and
unpaid under this chapter and all penalties thereon shall constitute a debt to
Salt Lake City and shall be collected by court proceedings in the same manner
as any other debt in like amount, which remedy shall be in addition to all other
existing remedies.
Sec. 20-3-11. Exemptions to license, (a) No license fee shall be imposed
under this chapter upon any person (1) engaged in business for solely
religious, charitable, eleemosynary or other types of strictly non-profit
purpose who is tax exempt in such activities under the laws of the United
States and the State of Utah; (2) engaged in a business specifically exempted
from municipal taxation and fees by the laws of the United States or the State
of Utah; (3) engaged in a business operated under the supervision of the
Division of Exposition of the Utah State Department of Development
Services and located exclusively at the Utah State Fairgrounds during the
. period of the annual Utah State Fair; or (4) not maintaining a place of business
within Salt Lake City who has paid a like or similar license tax or fee to some
other taxing unit within the State of Utah, and which taxing unit exempts
from its license tax or fee, by reciprocal agreement or otherwise, businesses
domiciled in Salt Lake City and doing business in such taxing unit.
Bill No 16. Feb 5, 1976

(b) Reciprocal agreement. The city license assessor and collector may,
with approval of the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, enter into
reciprocal agreements with the proper officials of other taxing units,
Feb. 1967
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as may be deemed equitable and proper in effecting the exemption provided
for in paragraph (a) of this section.
Sec. 20-3-12. Fee not to constitute undue burden on interstate commerce.
None of the license fees provided for by this chapter shall be applied as to
occasion an undue burden on interstate commerce. In any case where a license
fee is believed by a licensee or applicant for license to place an undue burden
upon such commerce, he may apply to the license assessor and collector for an
adjustment of the fee so that it shall not be discriminatory, unreasonable or
unfair as to such commerce. Such application may be made before, at or
within six months after payment of the prescribed license fee. The applicant
shall, by affidavit and supporting testimony show his method of business and
the gross volume or estimated gross volume of business and such other
information as the license assessor and collector may deem necessary in order
to determine the extent, if any, of such undue burden on such commerce. The
license assessor and collector shall then conduct an investigation, comparing
applicant's business with other businesses of like nature and shall make findings of facts from which he shall determine whether the fee fixed by this
chapter is discriminatory, unreasonable or unfair as to applicant's business
and shall recommend to the board of commissioners a license fee for the applicant in an amount that is nondiscriminatory, reasonable and fair, and if the
board of commissioners is satisfied that such license fee is the amount that the
applicant should pay, it shall fix the license fee in such amount. If the regular
license fee has already been paid, the board of commissioners shall order a
refund of the amount over and above the fee fixed by the board. In fixing the
fee to be charged, the license assessor and collector shall have the power to
base the fee upon a percentage of gross sales, or employees, or may use any
other method which will assure that the fee assessed shall be uniform with
that assessed on businesses of like nature; provided, however, that the
amount assessed shall not exceed the fee prescribed in section 20-3-2.
Sec. 20-3-12.1. Branch establishments. A separate license must be obtained for each branch establishment or location of business engaged in,
within the city, as if such branch establishment or location were a separate
business and each license shall authorize the licensee to engage only in the
business licensed thereby at the location or in the manner designated in such
license, provided, that warehouses and distributing places used in connection
with or incident to a business licensed under this ordinance shall not be
deemed to be separate places of business or branch establishments.
Sec. 20-3-12.2. Joint license. Whenever any person is engaged in two or
more businesses at the same location within the city, such person shall not be
required to obtain separate licenses for conducting each of such businesses, but shall be issued one license which shall specify on its face all
such businesses. The license tax to be paid shall be computed as if all of
Feb 1967
June 1975
October, 1976
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said businesses were one business being conducted at such location. Where
two or more persons conduct separate businesses at the same location, each
such person shall obtain a license for such business and pay the required
license tax for such business.
Sec. 20-3-12.3. Revenue measure. This ordinance is enacted solely to raise
revenue for municipal purposes and is not a substitute for other regulatory ordinances. The foregoing notwithstanding, no revenue license may be issued for
a business operation which, on the face of the license application, would be in
violation of criminal laws or ordinances or where the place of business would
be located in an area not zoned for such business activity.
Sec. 20-3-13. Separability clause. If any subsection, sentence, clause,
phrase or portion of this chapter, including but not limited to any exemption,
is for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by the decision of any
court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity of
the remaining portions of this chapter. The board of commissioners of Salt
Lake City hereby declares that it would have adopted this chapter and each
subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or portion thereof, irrespective of the fact
that any one or more subsections, sentences, clauses, phrases, or portions
thereof be declared invalid or unconstitutional.
Sec. 20-3-14. Utility revenue tax. There is hereby levied upon the business
of every person or company engaged in business in Salt Lake City, Utah, of
supplying telephone, gas or electric energy service as public utilities, an annual license tax equal to four percentum of the gross revenue derived from the
sale and use of the services of said utilities delivered from and after January 1,
1981, within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City, said fee being in addition
to the two percent franchise fee.
The term "gross revenue", as used herein, shall be construed to mean the
revenue derived from the sale and use of public utility services within Salt
Lake City, provided that "gross revenue'' as applied to the telephone utility
shall be construed to mean basic local exchange services revenue received from
subscribers located within Salt Lake City and directly connected with the
switchboards of said utility located in the City.
"Public utility services" shall mean the sale and use of electric power and
energy, natural gas and local exchange telephone services.
Within forty-five days after the close of each month in a calendar year, any
public utility taxes hereunder shall file with the City Treasurer of Salt Lake
City a report of its gross revenue derived from the sale and use of public utility
service in Salt Lake City as defined herein, together with a computation of the
526a
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SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE
No. 2 Of 1982
(Utility Revenue Tax)
AN ORDINANCE A M E N D ING SECTION 20-3-14 OF
THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY,
UTAH, 1965. RELATING TO
UTILITY R E V E N U E TAX.
Be it ordained by the City
Council of Salt Lake City,
Utah:
SECTION 1. That Section 203-U of the Revised Ordinances
of Salt Lake City, Utah, be.
and the same hereby
is
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20-3-14. Utility revenue
tax. (1) There is hereby levied
uoon the business of every
person or company engaged
In business in Salt Lake City,
Utah, of supplying telephone,
gas or electric energy service
as public utilities, an annual
license tax equal to four percentum of the gross revenue
derived from the sale and use
of the services of said utilities
delivered from and after July
1, 1980, within the corporate
limits of Salt Lake City, said
fee being in addition to the
two percent franchise fee.
(2) Definitions:
(a) Gross revenue. "Gross
revenue",, as used herein,
shall be construed to mean
the revenue derived from the
sale and use of public utility
services within Salt Lake
City, provided that "gross
revenue" as applied to the
telephone utility shall be construed to mean basic local
exchange services revenue.
(b) Basic local exchange
service revenue. Basic local
exchange service revenue as
used herein shall mean revenues received from the furnishing of telecommunications
within Salt Lake City and
access to the telecommunications network to either business, residential or other customers wt)ett>er on a flat rate
or measured basis, by means
of an access line. Basic local
exchange service revenues
shall not include revenues

obtained by the telephone
public utility company from
the provision of terminal telephone
equipment
services
(such as basic telephone sets.
private branch exchanges and
key telephone systems), or
from other telephone equipment which is obtainable from
both the telephone company
and other suppliers.
(c) Public utility services.
"Public utility services" as
used herein shall mean the
sale and use of electric power
and energy, natural gas and
basic local exchange telephone service.
(3) Remittance Date. Within
forty-five days after the end of
each month in a calendar
year, the public utility taxed
hereunder shall file with the
city treasurer of Salt Lake
City a report of its gross revenue derived from the sale and
use of public utility service in
Salt Lake City as defined
herein, together with a computation of the tax levied
hereunder against the utility.
Coincidental with the filing of
such report, the utility shall
pay to Ihe city treasurer the
amount of the tax due for that
calendar month subiect to
said reoort.
SECTION 2. This ordinance
shall become effective July 1,
1982.
Passed by the City Council
of Salt Lake City, Utah, this
5th day of January, 1982.
Sydney R. Fonnesbeck
CHAIRAAAN
ATTEST:
Kathryn Marshall
CITY RECORDER
Transmitted to Mayor on
1/11/82
Mayor's Action:
Ted Wilson
MAYOR
ATTEST:
Kathryn Marshall
CITY RECORDER
cm 39
(SEAL)
BILL 2 of 1982
Published January 27,1982
D-55
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tax levied hereunder against the utility. Coincidental with the filing of such
report, the utility shall pay to the City Treasurer the amount of the tax.
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Sec. 20-3-14.1. Revenue tax on business in competition with public
utilities. There is hereby levied upon the business of every person or company
engaged in the business in Salt Lake City, Utah, of supplying telephone service, gas or electric energy service in competition with public utilities, an
annual licence tax equal to six percentum of the gross revenue derived from
the sale and use of such competitive services delivered from and after
November 1, 1977, within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City.
"In competition and public utilities" shall mean to trade in products or
services within the same market as a public utility taxed under section 14 of
this chapter.
Within forty-five days after the close of each month in a calendar year, any
business taxed hereunder shall file with the city treasurer of Salt Lake City a
report of its gross revenue derived from the sale and use of services specified
hereunder rendered in competition with public utilities in Salt Lake City,
together with a computation of the tax levied hereunder against such
business. Coincidental with the filing of such report, the business shall pay to
the city treasurer the amount of the tax.
Bill No. 119. 1977
Bill No. 171, 1977

A 'teatfcl
Sec. 20-3-14.2. Commercial consumers of gas or electric energy. Any commercial consumer of gas or electric energy which is engaged in business in Salt
Lake City, Utah, and which consumes gas or electric energy provided by a
public utility subject to the utility revenue tax imposed by this section shall be
entitled to a rebate of that portion of the combined utility revenue tax and two
percent franchise fee which exceeds three-fourths of one percent of the gross
sales of said commercial consumer.
For the purposes of this subsection it shall be deemed that the amount
paid by each qualifying commercial consumer to each subject public utility for
gas or electric energy includes a payment of six percent utility revenue tax and
a payment of two percent franchise fee. The term "gross sales" as used in this
subsection, shall be defined consistent with the definition of that term as
found in the Internal Revenue Code as of the effective date of this ordinance.
Rebates shall be made on a yearly basis to coincide with the commercial
consumer's taxable year as adopted for federal income tax purposes. Application shall be made to the City Treasurer of Salt Lake City for the rebate
provided herein no sooner than forty-five days and no later than four months
after the close of the commercial consumer's taxable year.
^.t
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SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE
No. 1 of 1982
(Revenue Tax on Business in Competition
with Public Utilities and Commercial
Consumers of Gas or Electric Energy)
AN ORDINANCE A M E N D I N G SECTIONS 20-3-U.1 AND
20-3-14.2 OF T H E REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE
CITY, UTAH, 1965. RELATING TO R E V E N U E TAX ON
BUSINESS IN COMPETITION WITH PUBLIC U T I L I T I E S
A N D COMMERCIAL CONSUMERS OF GAS OR ELECTRIC
ENERGY.
Be it ordained by the City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah:
SECTION 1. That Sections 20-3-14.1 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, relating to revenue tax on
business in competition with public utilities, be, and the same
hereby is amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20-3-14.1. (1) Revenue tax on business in competition
with public utilities. There is hereby levied upon the business
of every person or company engaged in the business in Salt
Lake City, Utah, of supplying basic local exchange telephone
service, as defined in Section 20-3-U of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, natural gas or electric energy service in competition with public utilities, as annual license tax
equal to four percentum of the gross revenue derived from the
sale and use of such competitive services sold, used or delivered within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City, after
November 1, 1977.
(2) Definitions. In Competition With Public Utilities. " I n
competition with public utilities" shall mean to trade in products or services within the same market as a public utility
taxed under section 14 of this chapter.
(3) Remuneration Date. Within forty-five days after the
end of each month in a calendar year, any business taxed
hereunder shall file with the city treasurer of Salt Lake City a
report of its gross revenue derived from the sale and use of
services specified hereunder rendered in competition with
public utilities in Salt Lake City, together with a computation
of the tax levied hereunder against such business. Coincidental with the filing of such report, the business shall pay to the
city treasurer the amount of the tax due for the calendar
month which is the subject of the said report.
SECTION 2. That Section 20-3-U.2 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, relating to commercial consumers of gas or electric energy, be, and the same hereby is
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20-3-14.2. Commercial consumers of gas or electric
energy. Any commercial consumer of gas or electric energy
which is engaged in business in Salt Lake City, Utah, and
which consumes natural gas or electric energy provided by a
public utility subject to the utility revenue tax imposed by this
section shall be entitled to a rebate of that portion of the
combined utility revenue tax and two perent franchise fee
which exceeds three-fourths of one percent of the gross sales
of said commercial consumer.
For the purposes of this subsection It shall be deemed that
the amount paid by each qualifying commercial consumer to
each subject public utility for natural gas or electric energy
Includes a payment of six percent utility revenue tax and a
payment of two percent franchise fee. The term "gross sales"
as used in this subsection, shall be defined consistent with the
definition of that term as found in the Internal Revenue Code
effective for the consumer's taxable year during which a rebate is sought.
Rebate shall be made on a yearly basis to coincide with
the commercial consumer's taxable year, as adopted for federal income tax purpose. Application shall be made to the city
treasurer of Salt Lake City for the rebate provided herein no
sooner than forty-five days and no later than four months after
the close of the commercial consumer's taxable year.
SECTION 3. This ordinance shall become effective July 1,
1982.
Passed by the City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah, this
5th day of January, 1962.
Sydney R. Fonnesbeck
CHAIRMAN
ATTEST:
Kathryn Marshall
CITY RECORDER
Transmitted to Mayor on 1/11/82
Mayor's Action:
Ted Wilson
MAYOR
ATTEST:
Kathryn Marshall
CITY RECORDER
cm 39
(SEAL)
BILL 1 of 1982
Published January 27,1982
D-53
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SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE
No. 40 of l f t t
(Innkeeper License Taxes)
AN ORDINANCE A M E N D I N G CHAPTER 3 OF T I T L E 20
OF THE R E V I S E D ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE C I T Y ,
UTAH. 1965, BY ADDING A NEW SECTION 15 R E L A T I N G
TO I N N K E E P E R LICENSE TAX.
Be it ordained by n>e City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah:
SECTION 1. That Chapter 3 of Title 20 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, be, and the same hereby is
amended by ADDING a new Section 15 thereto to read as follows:
Sec. 20-3-15. Innkeeper license tax.
(1) There is hereby levied upon the business of every person, company, corporation, or other like and similar persons.
groups or organizations, doing business in Salt Lake City,
Utah, as motor courts, motels, hotels, inns or like and similar
public accomodations, an annual license tax eoual to one percent (1°A>) of the gross revenue derived from the rent for each
and every occupancy of a suite, room or rooms, tor a period of
less than thirty (30) days.
(2) For purposes of this section, gross receipts shall be
computed upon ttte base room rental rate. There shall be excluded from the gross revenue, by which this tax is measured:
(a) The amount of any sales or use tax imposed by the
State of Utah or by any other governmental agency upon a
retailer or consumer;
(b) The amount of any transcient room tax levied under
authority of Chapter 31 of Title 17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended ;
(c) Receipts from the sale or service charge for any
food, beverage or room service charges in conjunction with
the occupancy of the suite, room or rooms, not included in the
base room rate; and
(d) Charges made for supplying telephone service, gas
or electrical energy service, not included in the base room
rate.
(3) Any person or business entity subject to the payment
of taxes provided under subsection (1) of this section, shall be
entitled to credit against the amount of taxes due thereunder,
the amount of license taxes due the City under Sections 20-3-2
and 20-15-3 of these ordinances.
(4) The tax imposed by this section shall be due and payable to the City Treasurer quarterly on or before the thirtieth
day of the month next succeeding each calendar quarterly
period, the first of such quarterly periods being the period
commencing with the first day of July, 1982. Every person or
business taxed hereunder shall on or before the thirtieth day
of the month next succeeding each calendar quarterly period,
file with the License Division a report of its gross revenue for
the preceding quarterly period. The report shall be accompanied by a remittance of the amount of tax due for the period
covered by the report.
The City may contract with the state tax commission to
perform all functions incident to the administration and operation of this ordinance.
SECTION 2. This ordinance shall become effective July 1,
1982. No tax shall be due or accrue under this enactment prior
to such effective date.
Passed by the City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah, this
8th day of June, 1982.
S. FONNESBECK
CHAIRMAN
ATTEST:
K A T H R Y N MARSHALL
CITY RECORDER
Transmitted to Mayor on June 15,1982
Mayor's Action: June 15,1982
T E D WILSON
MAYOR
ATTEST:
KATHRYN MARSHALL
C I T Y RECORDER
(SEAL)
BILL 40of 1982
Published June 25,1982
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APPENDIX IX
OBJECTION TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF
MERRILL R. NORMAN (R-870)

niEo;:; CL«X'S '".-ICE
S*LT *.'.*•*" •":••: VTY. UTAH

Mm Z4 4 53 PM 'S3
HrfilXON H"D.r-;ciERK
ROGER F . CUTLER
S a l t Lake C i t y A t t o r n e y
Attorney for Defendants
100 C i t y & C o u n t y B u i l d i n g
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Telephone:
535-7788

DEPUTY CLERU

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH

LITTLE AMERICA HOTEL
CORPORATION, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

)
)

OBJECTION TO THE AFFIDAVIT
OF MERRILL R. NORMAN

)
Civil No. C 82-5220

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, et al.,
Defendants.

)
)

COMES NOW the defendant by and through its attorney, Roger
F. Cutler, and objects to the Affidavit of Merrill R. Norman, in
whole and in particular, on the grounds that it is irrelevant,
immaterial, lacks foundation, asserts opinions on beliefs beyond
the expertise of the witness, is based on hearsay and contains
matters either not admissible or not yet admitted properly in
evidence.

Further, the Affidavit was not timely filed in

accordance with Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
the calendaring order of the Court, and, therefore, cannot be
used to support motions for summary judgment by plaintiffs in

this action.

Among others, defendants specifically object as

follows:
1.

The affidavit on file in the within action in many

material ways is premised on matters not in evidence.

For

example, it contains summaries of business records which are not
in evidence and of which there is no foundation that he is
custodian.

See Exhibit "10".

It assumes population figures for

Salt Lake City based on heresay, without foundation or evidence
before the Court.

See Exhibit "8". It assumes building height

and size based on heresay.

See Exhibit "6". It assumes tax

distributions without foundation and based on heresay.

See

Exhibit "4".
2.

The affidavit makes conclusions and expresses opinions

and belief without foundation and beyond the field of the witness
expertise.

Defendants specifically object to the paragraphs and

exhibits set forth in the attached summary of objections on the
basis of hearsay and that affiant has no competence on the
matters therein asserted and that there are insufficient facts
upon which to base the conclusions, opinions and beliefs stated.
3.

The affidavit is irrelevant and immaterial to the

matters at issue.

Salt LaKe City Attorney
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Objection to the Affidavit of Merrill R. Norman to
Lon Rodney Kump, RICHARD, BIRD & KUMP, 323 East 400 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111; James M. Elegante, PARSONS, BEHLE &
LATIMER, 185 South State Street, P.O. Box 11898, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84147; and to Dorothy C. Pleshe, GREEN, CALLISTER & NEBEKER,
800 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133, by depositing
same in the U.S. mail with postage prepaid thereon this
of March, 1983.

c
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SUMMARY OF OBJECTIONS TO
AFFIDAVIT OF MERRILL R. NORMAN
Affidavit
Paragraph

Improper
Allegation

Objection

Rule

Nature of Airport funding

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E.
63 U.R.E.

Characterization and alleged necessity of
alleged operations, nature and effect of
Airport concession activities, and
nature of Airport funding

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E.
63 U.R.E.

Benefit from Airport

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

Tax discrimination

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E
63 U.R.E,

Characterization of defendant's claims

No foundation
Hearsay

Affiant's lack of awareness of
financing alternatives

No foundation
Irrelevant

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

10

Airport cost sharing and tax
discrimination

No foundation
Irrelevant

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

11

Claims of E.L. Bud Willoughby

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

12

Relative police benefits, police
benefits to plaintiff, police
computations, acre computations,
police utilization computations

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E.

5

9
J

13

Police Department expenditures,
cost of service computations, taxes
paid to general fund, relative Police
Department expenditures, taxes paid for
Police operation

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

14

Payments by guests for police and security

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

15

Relative per capita call rate

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E
63 U.R.E,

16

Relative financial burdens

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

17

Affidavit of Fire Chief

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

18

Fire Department services and
nature of hotels and motels,
heights and classifications,
use and floor space, sources
revenues and tax effects

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

19

Ambulance and paramedic services
and financing

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

20

Fire Department Expenditure allocations,
general fund taxes and tax allocations,
relative service and tax computations, and
effects of innkeeper tax

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
6 3 U.R.E,

21

Tax comparisons and computations, tourist
development benefits, effects of innkeeper
tax

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

Tax Law charges

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

-2-

taxes,
building
high-rise
of tax

23

Adoption and effect of tax law charges

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

24

Impact on innkeeper tax

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

25

Taxes and relative tax burdens

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

Exhibits 1 - 1 1

Taxes, populations, expenditures and
services; comparisons and computations

No foundation
Hearsay

56 U.R.E,
63 U.R.E,

APPENDIX X
10-8-39 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

POWERS AND DUTIES OF ALL CITIES
line Harding v Alpine City 656 P 2d 985
(Utah 1982)
City did not have authority to enact an ordi
nance requiring mandator} sewer connections
of all buildings located on property within 500
feet of an existing sewer line for the purpose of
defraying sewer construction costs this section
limits citys authority to require mandatory
sewer connections to those buildings located on
propertv within 300 feet of an existing sewer
line Harding v Alpine City, 656 P 2d 985
... , 1Q82)
Scope of city's powers.
A city has a wide discretion in acting under
this section Kiesel v Ogden City 8 Utah 237,

10-8-39

30 P 758 (1892) overruled on other grounds
Cobia v Roy City, 12 Utah 2d 375 366 P 2d
986 (1961)
This specific grant of power carries with it
such power as is necessarily and fairly implied
or incident thereto Bohn v Salt Lake Citv 79
Utah 121 8 P 2d 591 81 A L R 215 (1932)
St

f * e w a t e r PoUution control board.
Maintenance of a sewage disposal system is
a proper function of a city and Utah Const Art
^ 29 prohibits state water pollution control
board from applying rules interfering with the
internal sewer system of a city State Water
Pollution Control Bd v Salt Lake City 6 Utah
2d 247 311 P 2d 370 (1957)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am Jur 2d Municipal
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political
Subdivisions §§ 569 to 574
C J S. — 63 C J S Municipal Corporations
§ 1049
A.L.R. — Right of municipality to refuse
services provided by it to resident for failure of

resident to pay for other unrelated services 60
A L R 3d 714
Validity and construction of regulation by
municipal corporation fixing sewer-use rates,
61 A L R 3d 1236
Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations
«®= 170

10-8-39. License of certain businesses.
They may license, tax and regulate hawking and peddling, pawnbrokers
and loan agencies, employment agencies, auctioneers and auction houses,
music halls, theaters, theatrical and other exhibitions, shows and amusements, the business conducted by ticket scalpers, distilleries and breweries,
brokers, and keepers of public scales, stages and buses, sight-seeing and
touring cars or vehicles, cabs and taxicabs, and solicitors therefor, bathhouses,
swimming pools, skating rinks, smelters, crushers, sampling works and mills,
hotels, and other public places, boardmghouses, restaurants, eating houses,
lodgmghouses, laundries, barbershops and beauty shops, hackmen, draymen,
and drivers of stages, buses, sight-seeing and touring cars, cabs and taxicabs
and other public conveyances, porters, expressmen and draymen and all
others pursuing like occupations, and prescribe their compensation, may license, tax and regulate secondhand and junk stores and forbid the owners or
persons m charge of such stores from purchasing or receiving any articles
whatsoever from minors without the written consent of their guardians or
parents, may license tax and regulate storage houses and warehouses and
require bond to the city for the benefit of bailors therein, may license, tax and
regulate the business conducted by merchants, wholesalers and retailers,
shopkeepers and storekeepers, automobile garages, service and filling stations, butchers, bakeries, laundries, druggists, photographers, assayers,
confectioners, billboards, bill posting and the distribution or display of advertising matter
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10-8-39

CITIES AND TOWNS

History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 206,
s u b d . 38; L. 1911, ch. 120, § 1; 1915, ch. 100,
§ 1; C.L. 1917, § 570x38; L. 1931, ch. 9, § 1;
R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 15-8-39.
C o m p i l e r ' s Notes. — "They," as used at the
beginning of this section, refers to boards of
commissioners and city councils of cities. See
§ 10-8-1.
Cross-References. — Boxing contests,
§ 11-5-1 et seq.
Clubs allowing consumption of liquor on
premises, § 11-10-1 et seq.

Counties, licensing businesses for regulation
and revenues, § 17-5-27.
Employment
offices,
license
required,
§ 34-29-1 et seq.
General grant of authority, § 10-8-80.
Insurance companies, license or tax prohibited, § 31-14-4(5).
Pawnbrokers and secondhand
dealers,
§ 11-6-1 et seq.
Power to fix terms and manner of issuance,
§ 10-8-4.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Barbershops.
"Business" construed.
Butchers.
Hotels and rooming houses.
Interstate commerce.
Lawyers.
Licensing in general.
Merchants.
Motor transport companies.
Price advertising of eyeglasses.
Restaurants and eating houses.
Rules and regulations.
Social clubs.
—Restaurant activities.
Taxicabs.
Telephone instruments.
Barbershops.
Under this section, an ordinance fixing the
hours of business for barbershops is invalid.
Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124
P.2d 537 (1942).
The rulemaking power given to cities in reference to barbershops does not mean any rule,
but such rules reasonably related and designed
to protect the health of the public. Salt Lake
City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124 P.2d 537
(1942).
"Business*' c o n s t r u e d .
The term "business" denotes the employment or occupation in which a person is engaged to procure a living. Morgan v. Salt Lake
City, 78 Utah 403, 3 P.2d 510 (1931).

to regulate and license rooming houses and hotels. The right to license includes the right to
refuse a license for cause, and when it is refused, the presumption is that it was for a good
and sufficient cause. Larsen v. Salt Lake City,
44 Utah 437, 141 P.98 (1914).
Interstate commerce.
Former provision requiring license to canvass or sell by sample certain goods shipped
into state, but permitting the canvassing or
selling without license of goods not shipped
into state was void. State v. Bayer, 34 Utah
257, 97 P. 129, 19 L.R.A. (n.s.) 297 (1908).

Butchers.
A retail meat dealer is included within the
word "butchers," and this section, together
with §§ 10-8-43 and 10-8-80, justifies an ordinance imposing a license upon such business.
Provo City v. Provo Meat & Packing Co., 49
Utah 528, 165 P. 477, 1918D Ann. Cas. 530
(1917).

Lawyers.
Under former statute, cities had no power to
exact a license fee from lawyers. Ogden City v.
Boreman, 20 Utah 98, 57 P. 843 (1899).
This section is not applicable to the business
of practicing law, since the power of cities to
tax, license and regulate, under this section, is
limited to businesses listed therein. Davis v.
Ogden City, 117 Utah 315, 215 P.2d 616, 16
A.L.R.2d 1208, rehearing denied, 118 Utah
401, 223 P.2d 412 (1950).

Hotels and rooming houses.
This section confers upon the board of commissioners and city council express authority

Licensing in general.
It is believed that under this section the city
councils and the boards of commissioners have
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POWERS AND DUTIES OF ALL CITIES
] a r ge discretion as to the person to whom the
license mav be granted and as to the place of
Kuliness Perry v. Citv Council, 7 Utah 143, 25
p 739. U L.R.A. 446 (1891).
The power given by this section to "regulate"
includes the power to license. Provo City v.
Provo Meat & Packing Co., 49 Utah 528,165 P.
477, 1918D Ann. Cas. 530 (1917).
Merchants.
City may impose a general merchant's license tax upon one who is engaged in a general
merchandising business, including the sale of
meats, and impose a further license tax upon
such a business. Provo City v. Provo Meat &
Packing Co., 49 Utah 528, "l65 P. 477, 1918D
Ann. Cas. 530 (1917).
Motor t r a n s p o r t c o m p a n i e s .
Under this section, cities are given power
with respect to motor transport companies;
there, however, is no power to grant or require
franchises to use streets. Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 101 Utah 99,
118 P.2d 683 (1941).
P r i c e a d v e r t i s i n g of eyeglasses.
Ordinance prohibiting price advertising of
eyeglasses does not have any basis of relationsnip to public health and is therefore invalid.
Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385,284
P.2d 702 (1955).
Restaurants a n d eating houses.
Cities have the power to pass reasonable ordinances regulating restaurants and eating
houses. Ogden City v. Leo, 54 Utah 556,182 P.
530, 5 A.L.R. 960 (1919).
Ordinance prohibiting maintenance of
booths of certain dimensions in restaurants so
as to prevent persons of both sexes having no
regard for law or good morals from meeting in
such places was reasonable. Ogden City v. Leo,
54 Utah 556, 182 P. 530, 5 A.L.R. 960 (1919).
Neither this section nor Constitution of Utah
authorizes municipalities to enact civil rights
legislation and there is no common-law duty
resting on tavern keeper to serve patrol, thus
complaint seeking damages for defendant's refusal to serve food to plaintiff "under either the
common law or by statute or valid city ordinance" stated no cause of action. Nance v.
Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 106 Utah 517, 150
P.2d 773 (1944).

10-8-39

Rules a n d r e g u l a t i o n s .
Where the power "to regulate" a particular
calling or business is conferred on a city, it
authorizes such city to prescribe and enforce
all such proper and reasonable rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary and
wholesome in conducting the business in a
proper and orderly manner. Salt Lake City v.
Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124 P.2d 537 (1942).
The power to regulate business can mean
only such regulations as are reasonably and
substantially related to the safeguarding of the
public health. Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3
Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 (1955).
Social clubs.
— R e s t a u r a n t activities.
This section's grant to cities of the power to
license and regulate certain activities within
its jurisdiction, including restaurants, is a general grant of licensing and regulatory power
over certain named activities, but by enacting
additional statute giving cities the power to
license and regulate social clubs, recreational
associations, athletic associations and the like,
legislature indicated it did not construe this
section as containing such grant, so that city's
authority for licensing and regulating the restaurant activities of social club must be found
in latter statute. Salt Lake City v. Towne
House Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 424 P.2d
442 (1967).
Taxicabs.
This section permits a city council to require
that taxicab operators providing service within
the city to have a certificate of public convenience and necessity, even though their primary areas of service are outside the city
limits. Butt v. Salt Lake City Corp., 550 P.2d
202 (Utah 1976).
Telephone instruments.
Under Constitution, as it read originally,
and former statutes, cities had the power to
levy and collect, for revenue purposes, a reasonable license fee for each telephone instrument, operated and maintained by any person
or corporation and used exclusively within the
city limits for a local business and for which a
rental or a charge was made. Ogden City v.
Crossman. 17 Utah 66, 53 P. 985 (1898)".

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Licenses and
Permits <i 91 et seq.; 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal
Corporations, Counties, and Other Political
Subdivisions $ 471 et seq.; 58 Am. Jur. 2d Occupations, Trades, and Professions § 5.

C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations
§§ 168. 229 et seq.
A.L.R. — Application of city ordinance requiring license tor laundry, to supplier of coinoperated laundry machines intended for Uoe in
apartment building, 65 A.L.R.3d 1296.
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10-8-40

CITIES AND TOWNS
Validity of municipal ordinances regulating
time during which restaurant business ma> be
conducted 53 A L R 3d 942
Vahdit\ of state or local regulation dealing
with resale of tickets to theatrical or sporting
events 81 A L R 3d 655
Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations
«=> 621

Brokers suspension or revocation of real estate broker s license on ground of discrimination 42 A L R 3d 1099
Validity and construction of statute or ordinance regulating or prohibiting self-service
gasoline filling stations, 46 A L R 3d 1393
Validity and construction of statute or ordinances forbidding treatment in health clubs or
massage salons bv persons of the opposite sex,
51 A L R 3 d 936

10-8-40. Resorts and amusements.
They may license, tax, regulate and suppress billiard, pool, bagatelle, pigeonhole or any other tables or implements kept or used for similar purpose;
also pm alleys or tables, or ball alleys; may also license, tax, regulate, prohibit
or suppress dancing halls, dancing resorts, dancing pavilions, and all places or
resorts to which persons of opposite sexes may resort for the purpose of dancing or indulging m any other social amusements.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 206,
subd. 39; L. 1911, ch. 120, § 1; 1915, ch. 100,
§ 1; C.L. 1917, § 570x39; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
15-8-40.
Compiler's Notes. — "They," as used at the

beginning of this section, refers to boards of
commissioners and city councils of cities See
§ 10-8-1
Cross-References. — Boxing contests and
wrestling matches, §§ 11-5-1, 11-5-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Bagatelle, pinball, and marble machines.
Billiards and pool.
Card games.
Bagatelle, pinball, and marble machines.
The words "suppress" and "prohibit" as used
in this section are not synonymous, thus, a city
ordinance prohibiting the use for any purpose
of bagatelle, pinball, and marble machines is
not authorized, since under this section the cities have only the right to restrict in a reasonable manner the use of these machines Stevenson \ Salt Lake City Corp , 7 Utah 2d 28,
317 P 2 d 597 (1957)
Billiards and pool.
This section, when read in connection with
§§ 10-8-81 and 10-8-84, confers power with reference to billiard and pool tables, but does not
extend beyond the regulation or suppression of

keeping them, and § 10-8-81 does not go farther than the regulation of clubs Accordingly,
an ordinance prohibiting any person from playing at billiards upon any billiard or pool table
in any clubroom is invalid, for such power is
neither expressly granted nor necessarily implied or incident to any express grant American Fork City v Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P
249 (1930)
Card games.
This section, even when construed with
§§ 10-8-39 and 10-8-80, does not authorize a
citv to levy a license tax upon one maintaining
a room open to the public in which card games
are plaved Morgan \ Salt Lake Cit), 78 Utah
403, 3 P 2 d 510 (1931)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 62 C J S Municipal Corporations
§§ 168, 245, 263, 287
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Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations
=> 594(6), 621

